Bulletin Reprint

A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781–1981

United States Department of State

Bicentennial 1781-1981

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A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-1981

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The Early Years, 1781–1823

by David F. Trask
with the assistance of
David M. Baehler
and Evan M. Duncan

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The United States Department of State traces its origin to the "Department of Foreign Affairs" created by Congress on January 10, 1781. Six years had passed since the 13 seaboard Colonies—now formed into the United States—had begun their rebellion against the authority of Great Britain. Congress believed that they had earned themselves "a place among the rising potentates of Europe" and felt the need to cultivate "a friendly correspondence and connection with foreign countries."

The need for diplomacy was apparent from the start. Given the overwhelming military strength of Great Britain, the United States could hope to gain independence only if it attracted support of other countries, especially France and Spain. In 1775 Congress established the Committee of Secret Correspondence to communicate with prospective supporters abroad and sent emissaries to other governments. Benjamin Franklin

This unfinished sketch by Benjamin West of the signing of the Preliminary Articles of Peace between the United States and Great Britain on November 30, 1782, in Paris ending the American Revolution shows (left to right) John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens, and W. Temple Franklin (grandson of Benjamin Franklin and Secretary of the American Commission). The British Commissioner and his secretary never appeared at West's studio. This sketch now hangs in the John Quincy Admas State Drawing Room at the Department of State. (Department of State photo)

The Livingston Brothers

Robert R. Livingston (Department of State photo)

Edward Livingston (Department of State photo)

Robert R. Livingston was born in New York City in 1746. He served on several committees of the Continental Congress, including the one that drafted the Declaration of Independence. He was the first Secretary for Foreign Affairs, serving from 1781 to 1783. In 1789 he administered the oath of office to President George Washington. As Minister to France (1801–04), he helped arrange the Louisiana Purchase.

Edward Livingston, Robert's brother, was born in 1764 at "Clermont," New York. After serving as a Representative from New York and as Mayor of New York City, Livingston moved to New Orleans in 1804. He was a Representative from Louisiana (1823–29) and a Senator (1829–31) before serving as Secretary of State under President Andrew Jackson (1831–33). He then served as Minister to France (1833–35). His chief concern was with the French spoliation claims, involving compensation for damages to American shipping during the wars of the French Revolution.

served briefly as chairman of the committee, which in 1777 was renamed the Committee for Foreign Affairs.

Unfortunately, this committee's scope was strictly limited. As one of its most active members, James Lovell said: "There is really no such thing as a Committee for Foreign Affairs existing—no secretary or clerk further than I presume to be one and the other. The books and papers of that distinguished body lay yet on the table of Congress, or rather are locked up in the Secretary's [Secretary of Congress] private box." Franklin, sent to France as a representative of the United States, recognized the need for improved administration of foreign policy. Noting that Congress had placed the finances of the country in the hands of one person, he wrote: "I wish they would do the same with their [foreign] correspondence, by appointing a single secretary for foreign affairs." The first constitution of the new nation, the Articles of Confederation, permitted Congress to select "such committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States."

Shortly after the congressional resolution of January 10, 1781, Congress selected Robert R. Livingston, a delegate from New York, as the first Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He took office on October 20, 1781, and served until June 4, 1783. Livingston experienced considerable frustration in office. One historian notes that his duties were not "clearly defined and he was never

13 South Sixth Street, Philadelphia

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Soon after taking office as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Livingston set up his offices in a small, plain, brick house at 13 South Sixth Street in Philadelphia. This building was the first home of an office of foreign affairs as an entity separate from Congress.

The building had been erected in 1773. It consisted of three stories and an attic, with two rooms to each story; it had a gable roof which sloped to front and rear. A room on the second floor overlooking the street served as Livingston's office. Various "great personages" of the time "frequently clambered up the dark and narrow winding stairs" to transact business with the Secretary. Livingston's staff consisted of two Under Secretaries, a translator of French, and a clerk. The two Under Secretaries shared a back room on the second floor and the translator and the clerk occupied the ground floor.

The building ceased to be the home of the Department of Foreign Affairs after Livingston resigned in 1783. A succession of tenants then occupied it, using it at different times as a residence, a shop, and a boarding house.

given a free hand." Later he served as Minister to France and in 1803 negotiated the Louisiana Purchase.

John Jay, another New Yorker, who had helped Franklin negotiate the Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended the Revolutionary War, was appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs on May 7, 1784, and he remained at this post until 1790. Jay became a severe critic of his own organization, whose powers were ill defined and whose leader was never granted sufficient freedom of action. During the national debate on whether to adopt the new constitution drafted in 1787, Jay cogently summarized his critique of congressional foreign policy under the Articles of Confederation:

> They may make war, but are not empowered to raise men or money to carry it on. They may make peace, but are without power to see the terms of it imposed. . . . They may make alliances, but [are] without ability to comply with the stipulations on their part. They may enter into treaties of commerce, but [are] without power to enforce them at home or abroad.

In short, Jay concluded, Members of Congress "may consult, and deliberate, and recommend, and make requisitions, and they who please may regard them," that is, obey. He thought that few would do so.

The Constitution put into effect in 1789 obviated much of Jay's criticism. Article II, section 2 makes the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" and also gives the Chief Executive the power, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Finally, the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls. . . ." These provisions placed the conduct of foreign affairs principally in the hands of the executive branch, but certain powers conferred upon the legislative branch—especially to declare war, appropriate funds, and advise and consent on treaties and appointments—gave Congress significant ability to influence foreign policy.

The Constitution did not specify an exact division of responsibilities between the President and Congress for the direction of foreign relations, but early precedents confirmed executive predominance. Thomas Jefferson clearly delineated the reasons for this development; he insisted that "the President is the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations, and it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the nation." He concluded that other countries should not be given an opportunity to play off the executive against any other branch. Ever since the earliest days of the Constitution, Presidents and Secretaries of State have adopted this view, although they have recognized the important role of Congress in the foreign policy process.

On May 19, 1789, James Madison of Virginia, then sitting in the House of Representatives, began the process that redefined the functions of the Department of Foreign Affairs under the new Constitution. He proposed the creation of "an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs." At its head would be "an officer, to be called the Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs." On July 27 Washington signed legislation to this effect. Soon, however, a new law passed Congress giving certain domestic responsibilities to the new Department as well as foreign duties. On September 15, President Washington approved this substitute, which set up a Department of State with a Secretary of State at its head. The President immediately appointed Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, then Minister to France, to be the first Cabinet member under the Constitution to hold the position of Secretary of State. The author of the Declaration of Independence took up his new duties on March 22, 1790.

The small executive Department did not grow rapidly during its early years. Jefferson's initial staff consisted of a chief clerk, three other clerks, a translator, and a messenger. (The title "clerk" refers to officers charged with the composition of messages to overseas missions and other correspondents.) The Department's domestic budget for 1790, not counting expenses of employees overseas, amounted to a mere $7,961—the cost of salaries, rent, and supplies such as firewood and stationery. The Secretary of State's salary was $3,500. Total expenditures in 1791, both domestic and foreign, were $56,600. In 1807 the Department's staff included only a chief clerk, five other clerks, and some part-time help, along with a few retainers. The Secretary of State's salary had been raised to $5,000 per year. In 1818 a Presidential order authorized a staff that included a chief clerk, seven other clerks, and a few others. In 1820 expenditures for domestic operations reached $87,300; overseas operations totaled $253,400.

The early overseas service of the United States was as unpretentious as

Domestic Duties of the Department of State

On September 15, 1789, Congress passed "An Act to provide for the safe keeping of the Acts, Records, and Seal of the United States, and for other purposes." This legislation changed the name of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of State because certain domestic duties were assigned to the agency. Among these duties were:

- Receipt, publication, distribution, and preservation of the laws of the United States;
- Preparation, sealing, and recording of commissions given to Presidential appointees.
- Preparation and authentication of copies of records and authentication of copies under the Department's seal;
- Custody of the Great Seal of the United States; and
- Custody of books, records, and papers of the former Secretary of the Continental Congress, except those of the Treasury and War Departments.

Many comparable functions were added at various times since 1789, among them issuance of patents on inventions, publication of the census returns, management of the mint, controls of copyrights, and regulation of immigration.

Most domestic functions have been transferred to other agencies. Among the few that remain in the Department are: storage and use of the Great Seal, performance of protocol functions at the White House, drafting of certain Presidential proclamations, and replies to public inquiries.



Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, began the distinction between the Diplomatic and Consular Services. He established the policy of neutrality in European conflicts. When he took office in 1790, the Department included 8 domestic employees, 2 diplomatic missions, and 10 consular posts. (Department of State photo)

Treasury Department Building, Washington, D.C.

The first home of the Department of State in Washington, D.C., was in the "Treasury Department Building" which was shared with other government offices. It was located to the east of the White House, about where the center wing of the present Treasury Department building stands.

Completed in June 1800, the building was a plain two-story structure of brick on a free-stone foundation, with a basement and a dormer-windowed attic. There were 14 rooms on the first floor, 14 on the second floor, and 8 in the attic. After approximately 3 months in the overcrowded Treasury Department building, the Department of State moved into one of a block of houses on the north side of Pennsylvania Avenue between 21st and 22nd Streets Northwest.

the domestic establishment. Jefferson immediately drew a troublesome distinction between a *diplomatic service*, assigned the task of conducting political relations with foreign countries, and a *consular service*, which dealt primarily with commercial matters and the needs of American citizens abroad.

Benjamin Franklin had become the first American Minister to serve overseas when, on March 23, 1779, he presented his credentials to King Louis XVI of France. Other leading statesmen served as envoys during the 1780s—among them John Adams in the Netherlands, John Jay in Spain, and Thomas Jefferson in France. By 1791 diplomatic missions had been established in five European countries—England, Spain, France, Holland, and Portugal. Ministers concentrated mostly on two important responsibilities; they reported on significant activities in their countries of residence and executed formal diplomatic instructions transmitted to them from the Department of State.

Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania was the first American actually to take up consular duties. He was appointed consul in France on October 2, 1781, replacing William Palfrey who was lost at sea on his way to France. By 1792, 16 consulates had been created, most of them in Europe. In 1790 Secretary Jefferson asked consuls to provide "such political and commercial intelligence as you may think interesting to the United States." He mentioned particularly news of American ships and also "information of all military preparations and other indications of war which may take place in your ports."

A congressional act of April 14, 1792, first provided legislative prescriptions for the Consular Service. Although this law made no specific mention of commercial reporting, consuls provided commercial information and met the needs of American citizens within their jurisdictions. Consuls were expected to maintain themselves largely by charging fees for their services, not always a bountiful source of income. Unlike their counterparts of today, they did not receive salaries or allowances for expenses. Because of the uncertainty of adequate compensation, consuls frequently served for

First American Consul

William Palfrey (Department of State photo)

William Palfrey of Massachusetts was not only the first American consular officer but was also the first member of the diplomatic service to lose his life in the line of duty. A lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army and former Paymaster-General, Palfrey was appointed consul to France on November 4, 1780. He was lost at sea en route to his post. His name is the first on the plaque in the lobby of the Department of State listing the martyrs of the foreign service.

Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania, a merchant residing in France, was the first American consular officer to serve abroad. He was commissioned "vice consul in France" on July 10, 1781, and was commissioned as consul on October 5 to replace Palfrey. In addition to his consular duties, Barclay served as commissioner to settle foreign debts of the United States in Europe and negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce with Morocco in 1786. He was appointed consul in Morocco in 1791 but died in Lisbon in 1793 before he reached his post.

many years in only one location, and they were often inactive. In 1807 a consul in La Guaira, Venezuela, was relieved of his duties because "not a single communication" had been received from him since his appointment in 1800.

Besides working through the regular foreign services, Presidents asked special agents to carry on particularly important negotiations. The first such agent was Gouverneur Morris of New York, who made an unsuccessful attempt in 1790 to arrange British compliance with certain provisions in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783. The use of special executive agents gave the executive branch options that otherwise might not have existed, given the small size of the Diplomatic Service.

Representatives of the United States traditionally wore unpretentious clothing and adopted simple manners, a departure from the ostentatious practice at European courts. (For a notable exception, see box on "Consular Uniforms.") Americans deemed this policy appropriate for emissaries of a young republic that had repudiated monarchical tyranny. Thomas Jefferson, the most hospitable of men, was particularly opposed to undue ceremony and rigid protocol. He refused to recognize formal social distinctions at dinners held in the White House during his Presidency, especially the order of precedence—seating by rank. This practice greatly annoyed the foreign diplomatic corps.

Even if the democratic ideology of the new nation had not imposed republican simplicity, the meager salaries paid to American ministers would have produced the same effect. In 1817 President James Monroe, a former Minister to France and Secretary of State, complained to a congressional committee about the nation's failure to provide sufficient salaries and allowances for members of the Diplomatic Service. He insisted that an American diplomat could accomplish his duties only by gaining access to the most important social circles. "By taking the proper [social] ground . . . he will become acquainted with all that passes and from the highest and most authentic sources. . . . Deprive him of the necessary means to sustain this ground, separate him from the circle to which he belongs and he is reduced to a cipher." Congress did not respond to such importunings; ministers ap-

First American Diplomat



Benjamin Franklin, dressed in "the simple costume of an American agriculturalist," captivated Parisian society and laid the groundwork for French recognition of American independence. (Department of State photo)

Benjamin Franklin was no stranger to diplomacy when he was appointed on September 26, 1776, to a three-man commission charged with the critical task of gaining French support for American independence. He had already served in Great Britain as an agent for Pennsylvania between 1757 and 1762 and again from 1764 to 1775. His scientific and literary endeavors had made him the most distinguished American of the age.

French aristocrats and intellectuals saw Franklin as the Enlightenment personified. His picture soon appeared on medallions, rings, watches, and snuffboxes, while fashionable ladies adopted the *coiffure a la Franklin* in imitation of the fur cap which he wore instead of a wig. His popularity prepared the way for France to recognize American independence and to conclude treaties of alliance and commerce in 1778.

Franklin was appointed Minister to France on September 14, 1778, and presented his credentials on March 23, 1779, becoming the first American Minister to be received by a foreign government. His home in Passy became the center of American diplomatic activity in Europe. Franklin then served with John Adams and John Jay on the Plenipotentiary Commission that negotiated the peace treaty with Great Britain.

When Thomas Jefferson succeeded Franklin in 1785, the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, said: "It is you, Sir, who replace Dr. Franklin?" Jefferson replied, "No one can replace him, Sir; I am only his successor."

Diplomatic Dress

The United States took exception to the prevailing custom that obliged diplomats to wear elaborate costumes. Secretary of State William L. Marcy of New York, who served during the Administration of President Franklin Pierce, issued a dress circular ordering American dipolmats to wear "the simple dress of an American citizen." This term meant a full-dress suit. The difficulty was that American representatives could easily be confused with entertainers, undertakers, or servants. James Buchanan, Minister to Great Britain, avoided this problem by requesting that the Department allow him to wear "a very plain and black-hilted dress sword" when he appeared at court.

During the Civil War, Charles Francis Adams reverted to a costume that included breeches, buckles, and silk stockings. Queen Victoria is said to have remarked, "I am thankful we shall have no more American funerals." In 1937 President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive order that provided: "No person in the diplomatic service shall wear any uniform or official costume not previously authorized by Congress."

pointed to the most important posts, such as those in London and Paris, were regularly forced to draw upon private means. This circumstance sometimes had the unfortunate effect of foreclosing diplomatic service to people without personal fortunes.

At the very beginning of the Department's history, certain personnel practices were adopted that adversely affected American foreign relations for many years. Little or no interchange took place between those serving at home and those in overseas posts. Moreover, no provision was made to encourage transfers between the Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service. These circumstances limited flexibility and interfered with the development of professionalism; the basis for a professional career in the foreign service was not built until the 20th century. This situation reflected the general suspicion of all things foreign that characterized the early history of the United States. It also mirrored the declining importance attributed to foreign affairs after the War of 1812. Thereafter most Americans concentrated on the domestic activities of their government rather than on foreign operations.

The early Department of State and its foreign missions were chronically overworked, and so was the Secretary of State. John Quincy Adams, one of the most conscientious of men, complained of excessive responsibilities shortly after assuming his duties as Secretary in 1817. "Business crowds upon me from day to day requiring instantaneous attention," he wrote to his wife Louisa, "in such variety that unless everything is disposed of just as it occurs, it escapes from the memory and runs into the account of arrears." Despite the great prestige of the Secretary of State in the early days of the nation, Congress remained extraordinarily penurious when allocating funds to conduct foreign relations, a condition that endured throughout the 19th century.

Only the most strenuous exertions of those who served in the Department or in the overseas missions insured proper attention to the business at hand. The unusual abilities of the early Secretaries of State helped to counter financial stress and to reinforce the prestige of the Department. John Quincy Adams summarized this circumstance. Because of "the superior real and inherent importance of the Department of State in the organization of this Government, and . . . the successive transfer of two Secretaries of State to the Presidency [Madison and Monroe], a general impression has pervaded the Union of a higher consideration due to that Department, and that in the practice of the Government it is the natural introduction to the head of the Executive."

Despite important constraints on the Department of State, the United States achieved a remarkable number of triumphs in foreign affairs during the early years. During the 1790s the Jay treaty (1794) and the Pinckney treaty (1795) regularized relations

Consular Uniforms

The early 19th century American consul was a dashing fellow in gold-trimmed uniform with cocked hat and a sword. This was on ceremonial occasions when, it is just possible, he liked to forget that he received no allowances for "house or office rent, books, stationery, or other ordinary expenses of office."

A 42-page booklet, *General Instructions to the Consuls and Commercial Agents of the United States, 1838* notes that: "The Consular uniform (as prescribed by the circular from this department, dated August 8, 1815, hereto annexed) must be worn on all visits of ceremony to the authorities of the place, and on all proper occasions."

The uniform was described as follows:

"Single breast coat of blue cloth, with standing cape or collar, and ten navy buttons in front; one button on each side of the cape; four on each cuff; four under each pocket flap; and one on each hip and in the folds; two on each side in the centre; and one on each side of the same, at the lower extremity of the skirts.

"The font, (from the cape down to the lower extremity of the skirts,) cuffs, cape, and pocket flaps, to embroidered in gold, representing a vine composed of olive leaves, and the button-holes to be worked with gold thread; the button-holes to correspond with the width of the embroidery, which is not to exceed two inches in any part.

"Vest and small clothes of white, and navy buttons; the former to have ten in front, and four under each pocket flap. With this dress, a cocked hat, small sword, and shoes and buckles are to be worn. The hat to be furnished with gold loop, gold tassels, and black cockade, with gold eagle in the centre; added to which, it is to be understood that the mountings of the sword, and shoe and knee buckles, are to be gold; otherwise gilt."



Burning of Washington, 1814

The home of the Department of State after 1801 was known merely as "the public building west of the President's house" and stood on the present site of the Old Executive Office Building at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. When British forces invaded Washington on August 24, 1814, this building was burned, along with the Capitol and the White House. While the Department's library was lost, Chief Clerk John Graham had already seen to the removal of many important records, including the originals of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. They were stored in a deserted gristmill on the Virginia side of the Potomac River, 2 miles above Georgetown, and were later moved to Leesburg, Virginia, until after the emergency.

When James Monroe and Robert R. Livingston negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana territory from France in 1803, they made the greatest real estate bargain of all time and set a precedent for the acquisition of land. For $15 million, the United States gained 828,000 square miles, thus doubling its size. (Library of Congress photo)

John Quincy Adams became the youngest American Chief of Mission when he was appointed Minister to the Netherlands in 1794, at the age of 27. As Secretary of State (1817–25), he negotiated a boundary settlement with Great Britain, acquired Florida from Spain, and helped formulate the Monroe Doctrine. (Library of Congress photo)

with England and Spain. The purchase of Louisiana in 1803 during President Jefferson's first Administration guaranteed eventual control of the North American Continent between Canada and Mexico. Extreme dangers to the nation materialized during the War of 1812, but they were surmounted during the Administration of President Madison. And finally President Monroe's Administration arranged the Adams-Onis treaty with Spain (1819), which added Florida to the national domain and settled the boundary with Mexico on most advantageous terms.

However impressive, these accomplishments were not equal in importance to the formation of a general foreign policy for the United States that was to endure for over a hundred years: the idea that the United States should observe political isolation from European powers during time of peace and maintain strict neutrality during periods of warfare in Europe. Franklin anticipated this posture when he observed that "a virgin state should preserve its virgin character and not go suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others." In 1796 President Washington expressed this general outlook in classic form, arguing in his Farewell Address: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is . . . to have with them as little political [as distinct from commercial] connection as possible." Europe, he continued, had its own set of interests, and these interests were very different from those of the United States. Fortunately, the state of international relations tended to confer freedom of action upon the nation. "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?" Therefore, concluded Washington, "it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it." Thomas Jefferson, although of very different political views from Washington, confirmed the national consensus on the virtues of isolation and neutrality, restating the principle cogently in his First Inaugural Address (1801): ". . . peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

If it was appropriate for the United States to avoid intervention in European affairs, it seemed equally logical that Europe should desist from further interference in the affairs of the Americas. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams enunciated this principle in 1823. He was the real author of the Monroe Doctrine, which stated simply: "We could not view any interposition for oppressing [the nations of Latin America], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." Although the young country lacked the means to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and other powers did not fully accept it for many years to come, its presentation in 1823 marked the completion of the project that had begun in 1775—the independence of the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine extended the principles of neutrality and independence from European conflicts to the entire Western Hemisphere. (Library of Congress photo)

The Expansionist Years, 1823–1867

During the 44 years between the birth of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the purchase of Alaska from Russia (1867), the Americans devoted their national energies to extending their dominion across North America and to building a diversified economy. They were permitted to concentrate on these endeavors because no serious external threats arose except during the Civil War (1861–65). A stable balance of power materialized in Europe after the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, the maintenance of which deterred possible aggressors from interventions in the New World. Any nation that attempted to interfere in the affairs of the Americas would have exposed itself to considerable difficulty on the eastern side of the Atlantic. Therefore, the United States enjoyed a long period of "free security," that is, an extended moratorium on serious external challenges like those that had menaced it before 1815.

It was now possible for the ambitious republic to practice a liberal form of nationalism, one that stressed good will toward other nations and emphasized internal development rather than active foreign policies. John Quincy Adams set the tone for nearly a century of foreign policy on July 4, 1821, when, speaking of his beloved country, he said: "Wherever the standard of freedom has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." The republic would influence the world by offering an example rather than by exercising force. Americans would be "well-wishers to the freedom and independence of all"; their government would be "champion and vindicator only of her own."

These sentiments prevailed in the United States throughout the 19th century. In 1850, for example, President Millard Fillmore restated the fundamental premise of liberal nationalism when he insisted that the United States must grant to others what it deemed imperative for itself—the right to establish "that form of government which it may deem most conducive to the happiness and prosperity of its own citizens." This principle meant that "it becomes an imperative duty not to interfere in the government or internal policy of other nations." Although Americans might "sympathize with the unfortunate or the oppressed everywhere in their fight for freedom, our principles forbid us from taking any part in such foreign contests."

The shift toward domestic concerns and the practice of liberal nationalism slowed the growth of the Department of State throughout the 19th century. Secretaries of State after 1823 dedicated themselves more to preserving than expanding the influence of the Department. Presidents paid more attention to the Treasury or the War Department than to the guardians of foreign relations.

The low priority attached to foreign relations resulted in a tendency to depreciate diplomacy and its practitioners. Secretary of State Edward Livingston sorrowfully summarized this attitude as early as 1833. Americans thought of their ministers as privileged characters "selected to enjoy the pleasures of foreign travel at the expense of the people; their places as sinecures; and their residence abroad as a continued scene of luxurious enjoyment." Congress frequently adopted parallel views. In 1844 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs proposed to assign ministers to a circuit of legations, for example, a minister resident to serve Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. In 1859 Representative Benjamin W. Stanton of Ohio said that he knew of "no area of the public

A Most Undiplomatic Diplomat



Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a naturalized citizen of French extraction, was sent to Spain as the American Minister in 1853. The principal issue in U.S.-Spanish relations at the time was the future of Cuba. Soule sympathized strongly with those who wished to annex Cuba, a course of action that would provide territory in which slavery could prosper. Before Soule went to Spain, he made a strong pro-annexationist speech in New York, a serious diplomatic indiscretion that prejudiced his mission before it had begun. To add insult to injury, upon his arrival in Spain, he made an impertinent speech to the throne. The Spanish Government requested its revision before accepting it.

Soule further compromised his mission when, to avenge an alleged insult to his wife, he fought a duel with the French envoy in Madrid, the Marquis de Turgot. A bullet from Soule's weapon lamed the Marquis for life.

When Spanish authorities seized an American steamer, the *Black Warrior*, in Cuban waters, Soule immediately demanded that Spain pay an indemnity of $300,000 and dismiss the responsible officials within 48 hours. The Spanish Government rebuffed these demands, choosing to deal with the ship's owners rather than the U.S. Government.

Soule's most famous diplomatic enterprise was the drafting of the Ostend Manifesto. This document stemmed from Soule's meeting with the American Ministers to Britain and France in October 1854. Soule's despatch to Secretary of State William L. Marcy recommended an attempt to purchase Cuba from Spain for up to $120 million. What if Spain refused to sell? "Then," the message stated, "by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power."

When this bellicose message was made public, it aroused great criticism in Europe and the United States. Opponents of slavery unequivocally opposed acquiring Cuba under any circumstances. Marcy then rejected Soule's message and instructed him to continue negotiations for the purchase of Cuba. Soule, correctly assuming that his usefulness in Spain was at an end, submitted his resignation, bringing to an end one of the stormiest diplomatic tours in the annals of the Department of State.

service that is more emphatically useless than the diplomatic service—none in the world."

The practice of the "spoils system"—the award of government appointments in return for political support—reinforced the proclivity to undervalue the Department of State and the foreign services. President Andrew Jackson believed that "the duties of public officers are . . . so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance. . . . More is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience." This view helped to perpetuate amateurism in all aspects of government. The egalitarian celebration of the common man sometimes worked against efforts to improve the quality and status of those who conducted foreign relations.

The growth of the Department and its overseas missions during the years from 1830 to 1860 roughly paralleled the increase of the general population. The Department of State, which moved to the District of Columbia in 1800, was housed from 1819 to 1866 in the Northeast Executive Building located near the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue. Only four regular clerks were added to the Department between 1818 and 1845 to cope with an expanded workload. In 1856 the Department consisted of 30 officers and 27 supporting personnel, and in 1860 the foreign services employed only 281 people. Congress did not authorize the appointment of an assistant secretary of state until 1833. A second assistant secretary was permitted in 1866. The strains of office, including domestic political criticism, imposed great burdens on most Secretaries of State. One of them, John Clayton of Delaware, who served President Zachary Taylor in 1849–50, noted the consequences. "The situation I have filled was . . . more difficult, more thorny and more liable to misrepresentation and calumny than any other in the world, as I verily believe."

The difficulties of those who conducted the nation's foreign relations led one of President Jackson's Secretaries of State, Louis McLane of Delaware, to undertake the first general reorganization of the Department since 1789. In 1833 McLane converted the Chief Clerk into an administrator with broad responsibilities for the everyday direction of the Department. He also set up a bureau system to permit orderly discharge of business. Seven such units were established, of which the two most important were the Diplomatic Bureau and the Consular Bureau. In the Diplomatic Bureau three clerks managed correspondence with the overseas missions. One took responsibility for England, France, Russia, and the Netherlands. Another dealt with the rest of Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, and Africa. A third communicated with the Americas. The five other bureaus covered domestic affairs—translation; archives, laws, and commissions; pardons, remissions, copyrights, and library; disbursing; and superintending.

The number of overseas missions increased from 15 in 1830 to 33 in 1860. Most were located in Europe or Latin America, although the begin-

The U.S. Passport

Frances G. Knight was Director of the Passport Office from 1955 to 1977. (Department of State photo)

The term "passport" derives from the French words *passer*, to enter or leave, and *port*, a port. It literally means a permit to leave a country. Issuance of passports and travel documents was first mentioned as a function of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1782. The Department of State did not receive exclusive authority to issue passports until 1856. Prior to that date, governors, mayors, and even notaries public were known to issue passports. During the 19th century, the U.S. Government only required travelers to obtain passports in wartime. They would not be required of all travelers until 1914.

The earliest surviving U.S. passport was issued in France by Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John Adams to W. D. Cheevert, David Sears, and their servants on December 27, 1778, for travel to Holland. During the 1790s many passports were issued collectively to merchant ships and their crews.

An interesting variation of this type was issued in 1796 to ships bound for the Mediterranean. The top portion was detachable in a scalloped pattern and was forwarded to Algiers for distribution to Algerian captains. If an American ship was stopped, its captain was supposed to produce the lower section of the passport and match it with the upper section. The ship would then be allowed to proceed.

The passport function is the activity of the Department that the general public is most likely to encounter. There are passport agencies in Washington and 13 other major cities employing 649 persons. During fiscal year 1980, 3,045,041 passports were issued, and over 14.6 million valid passports are in circulation today.

Marine Security Guards

During the 19th century, the U.S. Navy was frequently called upon to protect American lives and property in remote parts of the world. Marine detachments usually took part in these operations and on occasion were expected to protect diplomatic missions. The first such instance took place in 1835, when four Marines from the U.S.S. *Brandywine* were assigned to protect the Consulate in Lima, Peru. The next year, one Marine was detailed to this task. Legation guard detachments were stationed at various times in Tokyo, Seoul, and Managua. A Marine detachment helped defend the Legation in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion, and a Legation Guard remained in China until World War II.

Civilian guards were unable to maintain adequate security at overseas missions, and the Department accordingly turned to the Armed Forces. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy signed a memorandum of agreement on December 15, 1948, which established the present Marine Security Guard program. The first detachments left for Bangkok and Tangier on January 2, 1949. Today 1,112 Marines are assigned to 119 Foreign Service posts throughout the world. Their mission is the maintenance of internal security. In an emergency, their basic task is to gain time for personnel to reach safety and for the host government to fulfill its obligations to protect diplomatic missions.

Five Marine Security Guards have been killed in the line of duty. The most recent fatality was Corporal Steven Crowley, who lost his life in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad on November 21, 1979. Nine other Marines are among the hostages in Tehran.

The Hülsemann-Webster Exchange

In 1850 the Austrian charge in Washington, the Chevalier Hulsemann, who strenuously objected to supposed American interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary, communicated an insulting message to the Department of State. His Government, he stated, had "deemed it proper to preserve a conciliatory deportment making ample allowance for the ignorance of the Cabinet of Washington on the subject of Hungarian affairs and its disposition to give credence to the mendacious rumors which are propagated by the American press."

To this statement Secretary of State Daniel Webster replied in kind: "Nothing will deter either the Government or the people of the United States from . . . forming and expressing their own opinions freely and at all times upon the great political events which may transpire among the civilized nations of the earth. Their own institutions stand upon the broadest principles of civil liberty; and believing those principles . . . to be . . . in fact the only principles of government which meet the demands of the present enlightened age—the President has perceived with great satisfaction that in the constitution recently introduced into the Austrian Empire many of these great principles are recognized and applied."

Townsend Harris was the first American diplomat to be stationed in Japan. As Consul General at Shimoda, he negotiated a commercial treaty opening Japanese ports to American trade. He then served as Minister Resident (1859–62). (Library of Congress photo)

nings of American interest in the Pacific Ocean and East Asia led to modest representation there. Ministers were sent to China in 1843 and Japan in 1859, and a resident commission was stationed in the Hawaiian Islands in 1843.

By 1860, 45 people held appointments in the Diplomatic Service, a remarkably small number for 33 missions. Their maintenance cost the United States about $370,000, an increase from about $200,000 in 1833. Total expenditures overseas rose from $294,000 in 1830 to $1.1 million in 1860. Some ministers supplemented their staffs by appointing "unpaid attaches," usually young men of private means who performed certain duties in return for admission into local society and opportunities for personal study and travel.

Similar growth occurred in the Consular Service. The number of posts increased from 141 in 1830 to 282 in 1860, reflecting the considerable expansion of foreign trade from 1840 to 1860. Consular functions enlarged, but hardships bedeviled life in the service. The American consul at Genoa during the 1840s, C. Edwards Lester, summarized the situation: "An American consul is often a foreigner, almost always a merchant, can't live on his fees, nor even pay the necessary expenses of his office; [he] is scolded or cursed by everybody that has anything to do with him, and is expected to entertain his countrymen, not only with hospitality but with a considerable degree of luxury."

However trying, Genoa was surely a more desirable post than the Brazilian port of Pernambuco, now called Recife. In 1858 Consul Walter Stapp reported from Pernambuco that one of his predecessors had resigned before taking up his office because he had



Caleb Cushing, American commissioner to China, negotiated the Treaty of Wang-hsia in 1844, gaining most-favored-nation commercial privileges and extraterritoriality for Americans in China. (Library of Congress photo)

received "such mournful accounts of this place as to disgust him in advance of his arrival." Moreover, he continued, "*four* others have left their bones to bake in these fearfully hot sands, without a slab of stone or a stick of wood to point the stranger to their graves."

Beset by difficult climates and low salaries, consuls rarely received much assistance from their government. In 1833 Secretary Edward Livingston noted that officials in the domestic service of the nation were "surrounded with the means of obtaining information and advice" but that "abroad, an officer is entrusted with the most important function, out of the reach of control or advice, and is left with, comparatively speaking, no written rules for his guidance." A few consuls apparently succumbed to temptation. An auditor reported in 1861 that the consul in Liverpool had not reported expenditures of public money for 3 years, "contracting public and private debts, which . . . probably exceed $200,000. It is perhaps some consolation to know that this plunderer no longer disgraces the Government abroad."

Congress delayed action to improve the situation of American representatives abroad until 1856, when it enacted a reform of the Diplomatic and Consular Services. The law concentrated on the most publicized problem—inadequate compensation. It prescribed salaries for ministers that ranged from $17,500 per year for London and Paris to $10,000 per year for most other places. (The ceiling of $17,500 for heads of mission endured 90 years, until 1946.) In addition, consuls were given regular salaries. Fees collected at consulates were henceforth to be sent to the Treasury. Written regulations were developed to improve the performance of the foreign services.

A 19th Century View

"Consul, n. In American politics, a person who having failed to secure an office from the people is given one by the Administration on condition that he leave the country."

Ambrose Bierce
The Devil's Dictionary

The act of 1856 represented a step forward, but it fell short of providing for truly professional foreign services. Most ministers and consuls gained appointment because of personal wealth, political services, or social position. Many lacked qualifications—even the most elementary knowledge of diplomatic etiquette. For example, John Randolph of Virginia, when presenting his credentials at St. Petersburg, said to the Czar, "Howya, Emperor? And how's the madam?" One of the few talented diplomats of the era who made a career in the foreign service, Henry Wheaton, argued in vain for a professional service that recognized merit and granted tenure to the deserving. Those with necessary qualifications—linguistic skill, awareness of diplomatic forms, and appropriate experience—should, he thought, "be employed where they can do most service, while incapable men should be turned out without fear or partiality. Those who have served the country faithfully and well ought to be encouraged and transferred from one court to another, which is the only advancement that our system permits of." Wheaton joined others in complaints about inadequate compensation.

Despite the U.S. failure to create professional foreign services, many were the accomplishments of the expanding nation in foreign affairs, and the Department of State made significant contributions in almost every instance. One striking achievement of the period was the successful resolution of many disagreements with the one nation—Great Britain—that might have threatened the security of the United States. Peaceful settlements regularly resolved Anglo-American controversies over boundaries, fisheries, and trade, notably through the so-called friendly conventions of 1817–18, the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, the Oregon treaty of 1846, and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850. Of comparable importance were successful negotiations that furthered the march of the United States across the continent, especially the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican war with the annexation of New Mexico and California in 1848 and the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. In all these situations, the United States took advantage of favorable bargaining positions. Despite the handicap of amateur diplomacy, no



Nicholas Trist, Chief Clerk of the Department of State, followed General Winfield Scott's army to Mexico City. Ignoring an order recalling him to the United States, Trist negotiated the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo with Mexico in 1848, extending American territory to the southwest from the Nueces River to the Pacific Ocean. (Library of Congress photo)

Seward's Abortive Initiative

At the beginning of President Lincoln's Administration in April 1861, the new Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York, proposed to end domestic political strife over the all-consuming question of slavery by pursuing an active foreign policy, one that might lead to declarations of war against France or Spain, thus uniting domestic factions against a foreign threat. Seward even volunteered himself as the principal prosecutor of such a policy. The President tactfully rebuffed this extraordinary proposal. Thereafter, Seward, whom Henry Adams described as having "a head like a wise macaw; a beaked nose; shaggy eyebrows; unorderly hair and clothes; hoarse voice; off-hand manner-free talk; and perpetual cigar," subordinated himself to the President and served him loyally and effectively.

serious setbacks marred the nation's foreign affairs between 1823 and 1867.

The most dangerous challenge to the nation's security during the 19th century occurred during the Civil War. That tragic struggle between the Union and the Confederacy created excellent opportunities for European nations to meddle in the Western Hemisphere either by violating the Monroe Doctrine or by extending aid to the rebellious South. In this instance the remarkably effective collaboration between President Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of State, William H. Seward of New York, proved equal to the situation. The Secretary's success in fending off serious trouble during the Civil War proved that great achievements in foreign relations almost always depended on close relations between the President and the Department of State. The American Minister in London, Charles Francis Adams, third in a line of distinguished statesmen from Massachusetts, established himself among the most successful diplomats of his time, preserving the neutrality of Great Britain until the Union Army finally prevailed over its opponents. If the Confederacy had received significant assistance from European nations, especially Great Britain, the war might have had a much different outcome.

The triumph of the Union in 1865 prepared the way for still another era of remarkable national progress, finally ending the dispute over the relative merits of national supremacy and states' rights. The nation emerged from the Civil War more powerful and secure than at any time in its history; it would continue to enjoy virtual immunity from international dangers —"free security"—for another 50 years.

The Rise to World Power, 1867–1913

The purchase of Alaska from Russia on March 30, 1867, gave the United States its first noncontiguous territory. (Library of Congress photo)

The 30 years after the Civil War are justly considered the least active in the history of American foreign relations. Free security, that fortunate byproduct of the generally stable international balance of power, lingered on, permitting Americans to devote themselves to their prime preoccupation—internal development. During these years, the westward movement was completed, and the nation experienced extensive industrialization and urbanization.

The absence of foreign threats to national security and the continuing national stress on domestic concerns during the latter years of the 19th century explain why the conduct of foreign relations did not deviate much from earlier practice. As late as 1894, an observer noted that the public was "less familiar with the duties of our diplomatic and consular agents than any other branch of the public service," a logical outcome because members of the foreign services lived abroad and could not be observed at work. As before the Civil War, xenophobic Americans regularly condemned their representatives abroad as subversive. In 1885, for example, Senator William E. Robinson of New York insisted that "this diplomatic service is working our ruin by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies. The disease is imported by our returning diplomats and by the foreign ambassadors sent here by monarchs and despots to corrupt and destroy our American ideals." The Senator's solution was to quarantine entering diplomats "as we quarantine foreign rags through fear of cholera."

Another familiar pattern endured beyond the Civil War—meddlesome political interference with the Department of State. In 1869, for example, President Ulysses S. Grant made Elihu B. Washburne, a friend from Galena, Illinois, the Secretary of State for a mere 12 days so that he could enjoy the prestige of having held that position when he took up his respon-

sibilities as Minister to France. Fortunately Washburne's successor, Hamilton Fish of New York, established close relations with President Grant and managed to minimize unwise appointments and policies.

Like previous Secretaries, Fish recognized that he could not administer the Department efficiently without the President's strong support. When General Orville Babcock, another one of Grant's friends, attempted to interfere in the affairs of the Department, Fish bluntly informed the President that he could not tolerate such activities. If the President showed lack of confidence in him, he wrote, "or when the influence of the head of the Department in the administration of its affairs, or the formation of its policy, is overshadowed by others, a sensible or sensitive man will appreciate that the time for his retirement has arrived."

Political appointments remained the order of the day despite growing public concern, manifested in support for creation of the Civil Service (1883), which did not cover the foreign services. In 1885, when the Democratic Party gained control of the executive branch for the first time in 24 years, Congressman Jonathan Chace of Rhode Island contrasted American and British practice on such occasions. "Whenever a change of administration occurs in Great Britain . . . members of the diplomatic service know that no change will take place in regard to their positions, but all over the world today every man in the diplomatic and consular service of the United States is packing his trunk and engaging his passage preparatory to returning home."

Nevertheless, certain members of the foreign services developed special competence and pursued careers in diplomatic and consular assignments. Prominent among them was Eugene Schuyler, who first served as consul at Moscow in 1867 and later held other posts in Europe before ending his service as the American representative in Cairo in 1889. Another was William Lindsay Scruggs, who began his career as Minister to Colombia in 1873 and moved on to several other positions, including service as Minister to Venezuela during the Administration of President Benjamin Harrison (1889–93). Two men who developed impressive reputations as regional specialists, Henry White (Europe) and William W. Rockhill (East Asia), extended their activity well into the 20th century.

Abuses in the Consular Service persisted into the late 19th century despite strenuous efforts to correct them. In 1872 a representative of the Treasury, DeB. Randolph Keim, reported the results of an extensive investigation of the Consular Service. He uncovered many irregularities, among them collection of illegal fees, improper exercise of judicial powers, fraudulent accounting, faulty administration of estates left by Americans who died abroad, issuance of illegal passports, and sale of the American flag. Keim thought that the most important feature of his investigation was the "ingenuity displayed by consular officers, since the Act of 1856 particularly, in defrauding the Government and grasping gains from various outside sources besides."

Few changes in basic foreign policies can be detected during the generation after the Civil War; the

Alvey A. Adee

Alvey A. Adee began his diplomatic career as a private secretary at the Legation in Spain in 1869. He became a clerk in the Department in 1876 and Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau 2 years later. Appointed Third Assistant Secretary of State in 1882 and Second Assistant Secretary in 1886, he became First Assistant Secretary of State just before his death in 1924.

Adee approved or drafted almost all outgoing correspondence and was a stickler for correct style and usage. In times of crisis he would install a cot in his office. Deaf, reclusive, and unmarried, he dedicated his life to the operation of the Department, advising Presidents and Secretaries of both parties and briefing diplomatic and consular officers. A longtime resident of Washington is said to have remarked as Adee bicycled past him: "There goes our State Department now."



Elihu B. Washburne had the shortest term of office of any Secretary of State—March 5–16, 1869. As Minister to France (1869–77), he witnessed the Franco-Prussian War, the Paris Commune, and the fall of an empire and the birth of a republic.
(Department of State photo)

Frederick Douglass



Frederick Douglass was born into slavery in Maryland. After escaping bondage, he became a leading abolitionist. Following the Civil War he received two diplomatic assignments. In 1871 he served as secretary of a commission sent to Santo Domingo to explore the possibility of annexing that island. More important, in 1889 he became Minister to Haiti and charge d'affaires to Santo Domingo. In this capacity he became involved in an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the Môle St. Nicolas in Haiti as a coaling station. In 1891 Douglass resigned his office after critics alleged that he showed undue regard for the Haitian point of view.

Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett, America's first black diplomat, was Minister Resident and Consul General in Haiti from 1869 to 1877. (Department of State photo)

"The Yankee King of Spain"

The appointment of Daniel E. Sickles as Minister to Spain in 1869 was the culmination of a flamboyant public career. As Secretary of the Legation in London (1853–55), Sickles had helped to arrange the conference of ministers that produced the Ostend Manifesto. He also had his mistress presented to Queen Victoria. As a Democratic Congressman from New York, Sickles gained notoriety for shooting his wife's lover in Lafayette Square, being acquitted of murder, and then forgiving his wife.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Sickles raised a brigade of volunteers in New York City and maintained them at his own expense until they were taken into the Army. He led the "Excelsior Brigade" into battle and rose to the rank of Major General and to the command of the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac. At Gettysburg, he moved his corps to an exposed position and lost most of his troops and his right leg. (The bones of his leg are on display in the Army Medical Museum.) In the spring of 1865, Sickles conducted a diplomatic mission to Colombia to arrange the passage of American troops through Panama.

Sickles was appointed Minister to Spain as a reward for his early support of Grant's campaign for the Presidency. He was instructed to offer help to Cuba in purchasing independence from Spain, opening the way to eventual annexation. Spanish opinion was outraged, and General Prim, the Spanish Prime Minister, was assassinated before he could reconsider. After King Amadeo I declined the offer of purchase, Sickles plotted with Spanish republicans in the vain hope that they would be more willing to sell after they came to power.

Sickles lived lavishly in Madrid, renting a box at the opera and having his secretary, Alvey A. Adee, order fine wines and luxury goods for him from London and Paris. Sickles frequently traveled to Paris, where he had an affair with Isabella II, formerly the Queen of Spain. Isabella herself was notorious for her affairs, and there had been much speculation about the paternity of her children. Parisian society promptly dubbed Sickles "the Yankee king of Spain." Sickles also married Caroline de Creagh, lady-in-waiting to the former Queen.

On October 21, 1873, the Spanish warships captured the steamer *Virginius*, as it carried arms to insurgents in Cuba. After Spanish authorities executed the captain and most of the crew, many of whom were American citizens, the United States demanded the release of the ship and the remaining prisoners. Sickles was instructed to close the Legation and return home if the Spanish Government did not accept these demands within 12 days. Sickles, however, was ready to close the Legation after 5 days. The crisis was averted when the Spanish Government offered to negotiate in Washington rather than Madrid, and Sickles then resigned.

Sickles left for Paris on March 27, 1874, and lived there for 5 years. After his return to the United States, he devoted the rest of his life to the preservation of the Gettysburg battlefield and to defending his conduct during the battle.

James Russell Lowell, Minister to Spain (1877–80) and to Great Britain (1880–85), was one of many distinguished American authors who held diplomatic or consular posts.
(Library of Congress photo)

George H. Butler, nephew of a prominent Massachusetts Congressman, was appointed Consul General in Alexandria, Egypt, in 1870. He dismissed all consular agents, auctioned off their commissions, and purchased dancing girls. Shortly before his recall in 1872, he was involved in a brawl with three former Confederate officers.
(Library of Congress photo)

overarching principles of isolation and neutrality remained firmly entrenched. In 1894 Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham of Illinois reaffirmed Washington's "great rule of conduct" in commenting on what he deemed a questionable departure from the policy of "no entangling alliances"—an agreement with Germany and Great Britain to share control of the Samoan Islands. "Every nation, and especially every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an impulse to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a highly imaginary way," he noted. To contain this tendency Gresham offered a traditional remedy: "To restrain the indulgence of such a propensity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to the world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the beneficence of popular government."

Perhaps the most notable development in foreign policy was the elevation of the Monroe Doctrine into an unquestioned article of faith as the nation gave increasing attention to Latin America. Secretary of State James G. Blaine of Maine responded to this development; he inaugurated the modern Pan American movement in 1889, although it did not prosper until the early years of the 20th century.

The limited importance assigned to foreign relations after the Civil War was reflected in the modest growth of the Department of State and the foreign services. In 1880 the Department had only 80 employees compared with 42 in 1860, and the total declined to 76 in 1890. The number of diplomatic missions increased to only 41 in 1890, up from 33 in 1860, while the number of consular posts grew during the same period from 282 to 323. Diplomats numbered 45 in 1860 and 63 in 1890. The Consular Service expanded much more, employing 1,042 people in 1890 compared with 236 in 1860.

Expenditures on domestic and foreign operations rose from $1.3 million in 1860 to only $1.8 million in 1890. These were limited increments, indeed, when compared with the increase of the general population, which approximately doubled between 1860 and 1890.

In 1870 the Department underwent a significant reorganization at the initiative of Secretary Fish. The principal change was a further elaboration of the bureau system that Secretary McLane had inaugurated in 1833. To cope with the growth in overseas missions and consulates, Fish established two diplomatic bureaus and two consular bureaus with geographic responsibilities. The First Diplomatic Bureau and the First Consular Bureau dealt with Europe, China, and Japan. The second pair of bureaus managed communications with the rest of the world—Latin America, the Mediterranean region, Russia, Hawaii, and Liberia. Five other bureaus were created—the Chief Clerk's Bureau, the Law Bureau, the Bureau of Accounts, the Statistical Bureau, and the Passport Bureau. The reorganization of 1870 endured for 39 years, undergoing only minor adjustments during that period.

In 1888 the Department of State moved into an imposing new home—the State, War, and Navy Building located at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., and in 1893 the United States finally upgraded envoys accredited to the most important foreign powers to the rank of ambassador. Previously all missions had been legations headed by ministers. Embassies were established in Great Britain,

State, War, and Navy Building



In 1869 Congress recognized that the building housing the Department of State (the Washington City Orphan Asylum) was inadequate because of the high rent, shortage of space, and the severe fire hazard. Consequently a commission was appointed to recommend a site and submit plans for a new executive office building to house the Department of State. By February 1870, it was agreed to construct a building on a site west of the White House, a site which was then partially occupied by the buildings of the War and Navy Departments.

The construction was to be done in stages beginning with the south wing in order to avoid interfering with the business of the War and Navy Departments. This would allow these two departments to remain in their buildings until later when those buildings would have to be razed to make way for the other wings. Just before the south wing was completed in June 1875, the Department of State began moving in. The War and Navy Departments moved into the east wing immediately after it was ready for occupancy in April 1879. The north wing was completed in late 1882 and the War Department moved into it in February 1883. The west and center wings were occupied in early 1888.

Upon completion it was reputed to be the largest and finest office building in the world. Exclusive of basement and sub-basement, it has a total floor area of about 10 acres and contains nearly 1–¾ miles of corridors 12 feet wide. These are paved with black slate and white marble. The eight spiral stairways with steps of gray granite are unsupported by either beams or arches. There is very little woodwork in the entire building, the most noteworthy being the doors.

The south wing had been planned and built for the exclusive use of the Department of State. The Secretary had his office on the second floor at the southwest corner and the diplomatic reception room—the scene of the signing of many historic documents—adjoined the Secretary's office.

Because of the pressure of space, the Department of State was forced to move some of its office out of this building and into rented quarters in other parts of the city. In 1918 the Navy Department moved to new quarters and all State Department offices were reunited in this building where they remained until 1936.
In 1930, following the departure of most of the War Department, the name of the building was changed to the Department of State Building. Again, however, the structure grew overcrowded and another exodus to outlying buildings became necessary. In 1947 the Department of State moved to a new location at 320 21st Street, Northwest. The old State, War, and Navy Building now houses the executive offices of the President.

France, Germany, and Italy after those nations conferred ambassadorial rank on their representatives in Washington.

These changes did not mean that the Department and the foreign services had altered their traditional practices. One historian described the Department of 1898 as "an antiquated feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone was an instrument of last resort." Most of the old problems endured into the 20th century. The Department and the foreign services were shorthanded; employees at home and abroad were seriously underpaid. Appointments were still subject to the spoils system, Congress having failed to legislate a system of selection and promotion by merit and job protection through the award of tenure to the deserving.

Suddenly, the general circumstances that had influenced the Department of State since 1815 were vastly altered as the result of a short but important war. In 1898 the United States became involved in a struggle with Spain that stemmed from popular support for the independence of Cuba. The decision to free Cuba was a startling departure from the practice of traditional liberal nationalism, but as a surprise it did not compare with the results of the war. The Treaty of Paris (1898) provided for Cuban independence and also for the cession of important Spanish possessions to the United States—notably the island of Puerto Rico in the Caribbean Sea, the entire Philippine archipelago in the western Pacific Ocean, and the small island of Guam in the central Pacific Ocean.

This assumption of colonial responsibilities overseas in two widely separated regions, a stunning aberration from liberal nationalism, reflected not only the temporary enthusiasms of 1898 but a basic change in the international posture of the United States. The old foreign policies reflected the circumstances of the earlier 19th century, but by the 1890s the situation had changed greatly. The nation had acquired almost all the attributes of a great power; it stood ahead or nearly ahead of almost all other countries in the critical measures of power, such as population, geographic size and location, economic resources, and military potential.

This striking rise in international status portended comparable shifts in foreign policy. President William McKinley drew attention to the new situation in the instructions he gave to the delegation of American statesmen who negotiated the Treaty of Paris with Spain. "We cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization." Another contemporary observer, George L. Rives, extended this interpretation. "Whether we like it or not," he wrote, "it is plain that the country is now entering into a period in its history in which it will necessarily be brought into far closer and more complex relations with all the other great Powers of the world," an outcome that would outmode established foreign policy. "We shall now and henceforth be looked upon as having cast aside our traditional attitude of isolation."

During the 16 years between the brief war with Spain in 1898 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the United States greatly enlarged its role in world politics. The nation measurably altered its posture toward the areas that it had penetrated in 1898—the Caribbean-Latin American and Pacific-East Asian regions—and thereby added significantly to the burdens of the Department of State.

Latin American policy involved an imposing revision of the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the 19th century the Monroe Doctrine was aimed primarily at European powers, which were warned to avoid further colonization in the New World. It did not imply the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations. President Theodore Roosevelt, reacting to concern that certain European nations might be able to penetrate Latin America by the device of collecting debts that certain nations had repudiated, asserted a policy in 1904 that became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. No Latin American nation that adhered to acceptable international standards of behavior, he said, need fear intervention by the United States. But what about less scrupulous countries? "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, require intervention by some civilized nation." Moreover, he continued, "in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power." This pronouncement led to a series of interventions in the Caribbean-Latin

Olney's Fiat

In 1895 Secretary of State Richard Olney addressed a diplomatic despatch to London for communication to the British Government concerning a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. This message gave early indication, even before the war with Spain in 1898, that the United States was moving toward a new assertiveness in international politics on the basis of its rise to great-power status. Olney's note offered a stirring defense of the Monroe Doctrine. "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers."



Spanish and American delegates sign the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898. The Spanish Empire in the New World came to an end, and the United States acquired an overseas empire and took its place among the great powers. (Library of Congress photo)

American region that greatly enlarged the U.S. presence there and added to the workload of the Department of State.

Meanwhile, the acquisition of the Philippines triggered the development of a new American policy for East Asia. As the United States gained a foothold in the region, European incursions in China threatened to cut off access to that vast country, just when Americans hoped to create a great trade in Chinese markets. Accordingly, Secretary of State John Hay of Ohio proposed in 1899 that nations interested in China should "enjoy perfect equality of treatment for navigation," that is, maintain the principle of free trade—the "open door." In 1900 Hay extended the open-door policy to include respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China. This commitment to the open-door policy led the United States by degrees into much expanded participation in the activities of East Asia, another source of additional responsibilities for the Department of State.

These extraordinary additions to the international political commitments of the United States ineluctably fostered many internal changes in the Department of State and its overseas establishments. The foreign policy community grew at a rapid rate. The Department was thoroughly reorganized to meet its new responsibilities, and important steps were taken toward the development of professional, democratic foreign services.

The Department of State expanded considerably during the years between the war with Spain and the First World War. When Hay became Secretary of State in 1898 the Department met a domestic payroll of 82 people; by 1905, when Elihu Root of New York succeeded Hay, the number had risen only to 119, but at the end of 1910, during the Secretaryship of Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, the payroll had advanced to 234. The Diplomatic Service grew modestly from 93 people in 1900 to 121 in 1910.

Expansion required a considerable increase in the annual budget. The expenditures of the Department at home and overseas increased from $3.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 million in 1910. The Consular Service experienced a particularly significant addition to its workload. The annual total of fees collected rose from $533,000 in 1898 to 1.6 million in 1916. This threefold jump reflected an expansion in the nation's foreign trade from $1.8 billion to $3 billion during the same period.

The growing responsibilities of the Department of State forced a thorough reorganization in 1909. The reformer, Assistant Secretary of State Francis M. Huntington Wilson, succeeded in enlarging the number of leadership positions so that thereafter the Department had three Assistant Secretaries of State, a Counselor to undertake special assignments, and a Director to administer the Consular Service. Lines of authority were clarified, permitting senior managers to make better use of personnel. Most important, however, was the creation of bureaus to deal with four distinct geographic regions—Western Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America—a move that fostered improved communication between the Department and the overseas missions. Several other bureaus and divisions were created to deal with various new responsibilities, notably a Bureau of Trade Relations and a Division of Information. A number of talented foreign service officers were brought to Washington to staff the new geographic bureaus, adding a much-needed leaven of experience.

Although the expansion and reorganization of the Department constituted striking departures, the most distinctive feature of the early 20th century was a strong movement toward fully professionalized and democratic foreign services. The transformation in American foreign relations that began at the end of the 19th century forced the nation to recognize that it paid dearly for amateurism in the conduct of foreign policy. One critic summed up the need for expertise in an article published in 1897: "As we would not put a ship into the hands of a commander ignorant of navigation, an army under the control of a general without military training, a suit at law into the hands of a counsel who never opened a law book . . . so we should not put the foreign affairs of our government into the hands of men without knowledge of the various subjects which go to make up the diplomatic science." Given the changed circumstances, President Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the necessity to upgrade performance: "The trouble with our ambassadors in stations of real importance," he told a

"Father of the Foreign Service"

Wilbur J. Carr (1870–1942) was born in Ohio and entered the Department of State as a clerk in 1892. He became Chief of the Consular Bureau in 1902, Chief Clerk in 1907, and served as Director of the Consular Service from 1909 to 1924. A believer in scientific management and administrative efficiency, Carr took pride in having brought Consular Service operations "as near to perfection as possible." He strove to extend professionalism and merit to all aspects of the Department, working for passage of the 1906 Consular Reorganization Act and helping to draft the Rogers Act.

Carr served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1924 to 1937. His duties included those of Chairman of the Board of Foreign Service Personnel and Budget Officer of the Department, a combination which allowed him to administer the transition from separate Diplomatic and Consular Services to a unified professional Foreign Service. His last assignment was Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1937 until the German occupation in 1939. "The Father of the Foreign Service" then retired from the Department, having served for 45 years under 17 Secretaries of State.

President Grover Cleveland signed an Executive order on September 20, 1895, that instituted examinations for consular appointees, a significant step toward professionalization of the Consular Service.
(Department of State photo)



Joining the Diplomatic Service in 1906, Joseph C. Grew served as Minister to Denmark (1920), Switzerland (1921–24), and as Ambassador to Turkey (1927–32) and to Japan 1932–41). He concluded his career as Under Secretary of State (1944–45).
(Department of State photo)

friend, "is that they totally fail to give us real help and real information, and seem to think that the life work of an ambassador is a kind of glorified pink tea party."

Various means of insuring professional and democratic foreign services were available to the Department. Among them were abandonment of the spoils system in favor of guaranteed tenure, adoption of the merit system as the basis for award of pay increases and promotions, selection of foreign service officers by competitive examination, and adequate pay and allowances. All of these practices had been widely publicized earlier as part of the campaign that culminated in the passage of the Civil Service Act in 1883, applicable only to domestic servants of the government. They were equally appropriate for the Diplomatic and Consular Services, and all of them received attention during the first years of the 20th century.

President Grover Cleveland anticipated the reform movement in 1895, when he issued an Executive order that made entrance into the Consular Service contingent upon competitive examination, but the most important steps occurred during the Administrations of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft.

In November 1905, President Roosevelt established the merit system for all diplomatic and consular positions, except those of minister and ambassador, along with competitive entrance examinations. In 1906 Secretary Root shepherded a law through Congress that created a grade classification system for consular positions and also to conduct annual inspections of consular establishments. However, this statute did not mention President Roosevelt's examination system or merit promotion; President Roosevelt remedied these omissions by means of another Executive order issued in June 1906. A few years later, in 1909, President Taft set up a board of examiners to administer both oral and written examinations to prospective diplomats.

In 1915 Congress passed the Stone-Flood Act, which permitted appointment of certain diplomatic and consular officers to functional positions, rather than to specific posts in the field. This step permitted reassignment by administrative transfer rather than Presidential appointment.

This sequence of events vastly encouraged the proponents of technical competence in the Diplomatic and Consular Services, although more remained to be done. The movement owed something to the earlier agitation for the creation of a civil service but even more to the spirit of progressivism that swept the nation during the first two decades of the 20th century. The Progressives emphasized administrative measures designed to enhance efficiency and minimize the baneful influence of excessive partisanship, especially in the form of political appointments. They opposed undue favoritism to the wealthy and privileged. President Roosevelt told a friend in 1908: "I am anxious to have it understood that it is not necessary to be a multimillionaire in order to reach the highest positions in the American diplomatic services."

This concern stimulated passage of the Lowden Act (1911); it was the first legislation to provide for the purchase of buildings to house overseas establishments. The author of this measure, Representative Frank O. Lowden of Illinois, hoped to open the way to the most important diplomatic positions for deserving members of the foreign services regardless of their economic circumstances. "It ought to be possible," he said, "for the lowest man in the foreign service to feel that it is within his power, if his service justifies it, to reach the highest posts." This sentiment faithfully reflected the Progressive conviction that competence should be the only basis for advancement in the public service.

The new assertiveness of the United States in world politics not only reflected the nation's rise to world power; it also stemmed from basic changes in the pattern of international relations. The stable international balance of power that had endured since the downfall of Napoleon in 1815—the source of so much national advantage in the form of free security during the 19th century—showed definite signs of collapse during the first years of the 20th century. Its final dissolution in 1914 precipitated the first European general war in a hundred years. Notable expansion and improvement in the Department of State after 1898 helped to prepare it for the unprecedented challenges that it encountered during the First World War of 1914–18 and after.

The Test of Total War, 1913–1947

The First World War marked one of the great turning points in modern history. It signaled an end to the century of general international stability and extensive economic, social, and political progress that had underwritten the security of the United States during its rise from a small and struggling country to an honored place among the great powers. The conflict of 1914–18 inaugurated an age of international disequilibrium that endured to the latter decades of the 20th century, generating political turbulence and organized violence on an hitherto unimaginable scale.

The First World War vastly affected the position of the United States in the international community because it destroyed the general stability that had nurtured Washington's "great rule of conduct" during more than 100 years of extraordinary national accomplishment. It drew the nation into any number of international entanglements that would have seemed inconceivable a few scant years earlier. Political isolation, however appropriate during the 19th century, no longer served the national interest.

When general warfare began in 1914 between the Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and later Italy) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey), the United States announced strict neutrality in keeping with tradition, but this course ultimately proved untenable. During the period of neutrality (1914–17) two prewar trends came rapidly to a tragic conclusion. As the Americans experimented with their newfound power in world affairs after the war with Spain, they decided that their national interests and aspirations had become complementary with those of the ancient enemy, Great Britain, and competitive with those of Germany, another rising power. Developments after 1914, which led to an ungovernable conflict with Germany over the legality of unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral shipping, simply accelerated a political process that had begun some years earlier.

Nevertheless America's entrance into the First World War in April 1917 as an associate of the Allies reflected the vision of President Woodrow Wilson more than the outcome of the controversy over submarine warfare. By 1917 the conflict had been transformed into a quasi-global conflict that verged on total war. Wilson came to believe that only the United States could shape an effective peace settlement, given the political and moral debility of the contending belligerent coalitions. The fundamental reason he decided on the intervention of 1917 was to insure that the United States would play a decisive part in the outcome of the war. Only by this course could he hope to dominate the postwar peace conference.

The President's plan for the future, outlined in the 14 points of January 1918 and augmented by later pronouncements prior to the end of the war in November 1918, envisioned restoration of a stable, equitable, and enduring international balance through the workings of a beneficent arrangement to provide collective security—the League of Nations—based on a consensus of the great powers. Wilson's attempt to banish warfare forever culminated the conversion of the United States from isolation to engagement in a mere generation.

The many changes that accompanied World War I posed great challenges for the Department of State. As the executive agency charged with principal responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, it was forced to assume duties undreamed of in earlier years. Even before the United States entered the war, the Department's workload spurted dramatically. Both the Diplomatic and Consular Services expanded their reporting functions to provide desperately needed information. They also augmented their support activity abroad. American citizens made demands for help, and

"None Is Swifter Than These"

The earliest American diplomatic courier was Peter Parker, master of the brig *Dispatch*, who was commissioned by the Continental Congress on July 10, 1776, to deliver messages to J.H. and Samuel Delap in Bordeaux. The letters, relating to obtaining military supplies from France, were weighted so that they could be thrown overboard in the event of capture.

The Department did not begin to hire couriers on a regular basis until World War I. Outgoing despatches would be entrusted to shipmasters, junior naval officers, or private citizens as necessary. "Bearers of despatches" were entitled to $6 per diem plus a travel allowance, payable by the Department upon completion of their mission. They also carried a special passport to certify their official character. One of the first such special couriers was a Post Office employee named Nat Crane, who left Savannah for London on May 24, 1819.

The Embassies in London and Paris became the first American diplomatic posts to hire full-time couriers in December 1914. At the end of the First World War, the American Commission to Negotiate Peace asked Major Amos J. Peaslee, who had organized a courier system for the Army, to perform a similar service for the Department. The Diplomatic Courier Service began operations in Paris on December 2, 1918, using military personnel. It was disbanded the next year when the Peace Commission concluded its activities, but 11 Marines and one civilian were then designated as couriers.

The Courier Service was disbanded again on July 30, 1933, as an economy measure. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered its reestablishment in 1934, while attending the London economic conference. The system was still based in Paris and had three regular couriers. By 1941 established service had been instituted to China, Japan, and the Americas. A regular system of worldwide schedules came into being after World War II.

The Diplomatic Courier Service reached its peak strength of 100 after World War II. There are presently 74 couriers. Despite the hazards of wars, revolutions, shipwrecks, and plane crashes, only five couriers have lost their lives in the line of duty. No pouch or letter has ever been stolen from a diplomatic courier. The emblem of the Diplomatic Courier Service is a golden eagle in flight. Its motto, "none is swifter than these," is taken from Herodotus' description of Persian couriers.

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919. At the close of World War I, the United States briefly abandoned isolation and attempted to establish not only a lasting peace but a new international order. (Library of Congress photo)

American missions located in belligerent countries often acted as caretakers for enemy interests in these countries. For example, the American Embassy in Berlin represented British, Japanese, and Italian interests in Germany until the United States abandoned neutrality.

The burgeoning responsibilities of the foreign services caused an increase in personnel and expenditures. Many temporary employees were assigned to duties at home and overseas. Resignations and retirements were minimized to retain experienced officers. Congress authorized a significant number of new permanent positions, including 27 in the Diplomatic Service, a jump from 70 to 97. The domestic payroll grew from 234 people in 1910 to 708 in 1920. Expenditures jumped from $4.9 million in 1910 to $13.6 million in 1920.

For the first time since the earliest years of the nation, the American people gave sustained attention to foreign affairs. The Department accordingly attracted considerable attention and even praise, a welcome change from the general apathy or distrust that characterized the heyday of isola-

A Man Behind the Throne

For a time Edward M. House of Texas exercised much more influence on President Woodrow Wilson's foreign policies than the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing of New York. He came to Wilson's attention during the campaign of 1912 and soon became the President's most intimate friend. A quiet, self-effacing man, but one of large ambition, House established close relations with important European leaders, particularly in Great Britain.

The President sent him to Europe twice during the period of neutrality (1914–17) to explore the possibility of mediating the European conflict. House later served as a special executive agent during the period of American belligerency (1917–18) representing the United States at an important inter-Allied conference held in Paris during November 1917 and at the prearmistice negotiations in October-November 1918. During the war House also headed a group of experts known as the "Inquiry" who prepared information to be used by the American delegation to the postwar peace conference.

President Wilson made House one of the American peace commissioners in 1919, and the Texan played a significant role in the negotiations that took place in Paris. Unfortunately for him, he betrayed a tendency to compromise some of Wilson's positions, probably the reason for a rapid cooling of their friendship. When House returned from Europe he was no longer welcome at the White House.

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tion. The rise of the "new diplomacy"—a term used to describe statecraft responsive to the desires of popular majorities—brought international politics and its practitioners fully into the consciousness of people who had never before concerned themselves with foreign relations.

And yet, despite its enlarged operational responsibilities and respectability, the Department of State lost much of its influence on the making of foreign policy. Almost all the significant decisions of the conflict—to pursue strict neutrality in 1914, to intervene on behalf of the Allies in 1917, to champion the League of Nations in 1918, and to negotiate a peace treaty on American terms in 1919—emanated from the White House without decisive contributions from the Secretary of State and his subordinates.

Several factors helped displace the Department of State as the principal source of advice concerning the most crucial questions of war and peace. One important reason was that President Wilson and his several Secretaries of State did not establish close and confidential relations with each other, almost always a precondition for influential leadership from the Department of State. Wilson relied primarily on others for advice, notably an intimate friend, Edward M. House of Texas. A less obvious but equally significant reason was that the Department was poorly organized to meet the requirements of wartime. It tended to act slowly, and it lacked expertise in treating military issues. Moreover, the exigencies of the national emergency dictated the participation of many agencies in decisions about foreign relations—notably the War Department, the Navy Department, the Treasury, and temporary organizations such as the War Industries Board—but the Department of State was not prepared to take a leading role in coordinating this activity. Finally, modern communications rendered the President less dependent on the Department for information than in earlier periods.

The experience of modern warfare revealed that the Department of State would have to undergo major changes. In January 1920, Secretary of State Robert Lansing of New York put his finger squarely on the reason, writing to a sympathetic Congressman, John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts: "The machinery of government provided for dealing with our foreign relations is in need of complete repair and reorganization. As adequate as it may have been when the old order prevailed and the affairs of the world were free from the present perplexities it has ceased to be responsive to present needs." Three

Lucile Atcherson passed the examination for the diplomatic service in 1922 and became the first woman Foreign Service officer. (Photo taken in 1978) (Department of State photo)

categories of reform were required to revivify the Department. The foreign services must be fully professionalized and democratized; the structure of the Department must be modernized to deal effectively with a whole new range of policy matters in a transformed environment; and relations between the Department and other participants in the foreign policy process must be clarified and conducted in a new institutional context.

Measurable improvement occurred in the first of these dimensions after the First World War, when Congress completed the prewar movement toward a fully professional and democratic foreign service. Representative Rogers, who led the congressional campaign, stated his objective in 1923: "Let us strive for a foreign service which will be flexible and democratic; which will attract and retain the best men we have; which will offer reasonable pay, reasonable prospects for promotion, reasonable provision against want when old age comes to a faithful servant." Hugh Gibson, a respected diplomat interested in reform, supported Rogers, arguing that improvements in the Diplomatic and Consular

Services would attract the most qualified candidates so that "we can choose our men by the only good method—that is, by keen competition." He hoped for creation of "a real diplomatic career, which is open to any American citizen who has the necessary qualifications."

The Rogers Act, which became law on May 24, 1924, codified the reform of the foreign services. It established a career organization based on competitive examination and merit promotion. To eliminate invidious distinctions between the Consular and Diplomatic Services, the two groups were amalgamated into a unified organization whose members were made available for both types of activities. Henceforth, members of what was now called the "Foreign Service of the United States of America" would be commissioned in a given class with specified salaries rather than to overseas missions or posts. Salaries would range from $3,000 for the lowest level, Class 9, to $9,000 for Class 1. Officers would be placed in positions for 3 years with the presumption of regular rotation to other assignments. The Rogers Act granted regular home leave and set up a good retirement system. It also authorized representational expenses, although these allowances were not granted until 1931. A special reinstatement provision permitted career officers who became chiefs of mission to remain in the Foreign Service after completing their tours of duty. Earlier they had been required to resign without assurance of a future Presidential appointment to other responsible duties, a sure way of discarding the most experienced and competent officers at the height of their abilities.

Related actions helped support the fundamental objectives of the Rogers Act. In 1925 the Foreign Service School was founded to provide specialized training in languages and other necessary skills—recognition that modern complexities of function required educational updating at all stages of a career in the Foreign Service. In 1926 Congress passed the Foreign Service Buildings Act, an improvement of the Lowden Act. It permitted purchase or construction of buildings overseas for the use of missions and consulates. This measure further lessened the need to possess independent means in order to rise to the highest levels of the Foreign Service.

Foreign Relations of the United States

In 1861 Secretary of State William H. Seward decided to publish his important diplomatic despatches. This decision established the policy of publishing the record of American diplomacy. The documentary publication entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States* is the oldest and most extensive enterprise of its kind.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series include in volumes "all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies." The editors are enjoined to honor "the principles of historical objectivity." They may not omit information "for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy."

In addition to annual volumes for every year except 1869, certain special sets have been prepared, covering important topics such as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the summit meetings of the Second World War. To date 283 volumes have been published. Volumes covering the 1950s are now beginning to appear.

Certain defects of the Rogers Act became apparent after a few years, especially inequities in the promotion of people serving in consular assignments, and Congress moved to correct them in 1931. The Moses-Linthicum Act reorganized the Board of Foreign Service Personnel to insure impartial promotion practices. Other sections of the law improved salaries, authorized paid annual leave and sick leave, set up an improved retirement system, and conferred career status on clerks in the Foreign Service. Unfortunately many of these gains proved transient. Economies in government that accompanied the Great Depression led to suspension of promotion, a reduction of 15% in salaries, abolition of representational and living allowances, elimination of paid home leaves, and suspension of recruiting for 4 years. The result was a 10% reduction in the size of the service between July 1932 and December 1934.

The Department of State did not undergo a thorough structural reorganization after the First World War. In 1924 the Secretary, who had final responsibility for policy and administration, had relatively few senior officials to help him. The Under Secretary provided support on policies of special import. Three Assistant Secretaries helped with certain matters—the First Assistant Secretary with economic and financial questions, the Second Assistant Secretary with international law and related questions, and the Third Assistant Secretary with administration. The Chief Clerk supervised the Department's clerks and looked after its property. The Director of the Consular Service served as budget officer for the Department as well as the principal consular official. The Solicitor handled legal business, and the Economic Adviser made recommendations concerning international trade and finance. Five geographic bureaus maintained communications between Washington and missions abroad. Various other organizations, such as the Division of Passport Control and the Bureau of Accounts, provided various types of support.

From time to time modifications were made in the basic structure created in 1909. New divisions or bureaus were created on occasion to manage new functions or to improve established ones. For example, a Division of Publications was established in 1921 to centralize work on informational projects such as the documentary series *Foreign Relations of the United States*. In 1929 a Division of International Conferences and Protocol was formed to cope with a considerable increase in the number of multilateral negotiations that occurred during the postwar decade and after. In 1938 a Division of Cultural Relations appeared that dealt with a new form of activity—cultural diplomacy—and also a Division of International Communications that provided modern telecommunications.

In the absence of an overall reorganization, these changes, however helpful in themselves, did not make sufficient impact. The failure to modernize the Department of State reflected the general decline in the nation's commitment to an energetic foreign policy after the Senate repudiated the Treaty of Versailles. President Wilson was the first American leader to develop an international vision that cast the United States in the role of global leader, but the nation was not yet prepared to accept permanent international responsibilities commensurate with its power. Charles G. Dawes, who served as Ambassador to Great Britain during the Administration of President Herbert Hoover (1929–33), could say only half humorously that being an ambassador was hard on the feet and easy on the brain.

During the 1920s Americans stoutly resisted international commitments of a truly binding character. Largely because of leadership from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the Administration of President Warren G. Harding sponsored the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921–22, and Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, who served President Calvin Coolidge, played a leading role in the creation of the Paris Peace Pact (1928), a multilateral instrument that outlawed offensive warfare. But these accomplishments did not alter the strongly isolationist cast of American foreign policy—a reversion that stemmed not only from disillusionment after the First World War but from the absence of apparent challenges to national security. Clear and present dangers materialized after 1929 during the Great Depression. These massive economic shocks reinforced the country's isolationist inclinations during the rise of totalitarianism.

The consequence of these developments for the Department of State and the Foreign Service was a tendency to accept the relatively low priority attached to international affairs during the "long armistice" from 1919 to 1939. In the 1920s the Department of Commerce rather than the Department of State provided leadership in sponsoring expanded international trade and investment. During the early years of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull of Tennessee, strongly supported efforts to reduce barriers to international trade, but this enterprise was not by itself sufficient to combat the Depression or deter German aggression in Europe and Japanese expansion in East Asia.

Despite rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, the United States hosted the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1921–22. Representatives of nine nations reached agreements to limit naval construction and to respect each other's interests in the Far East. (Library of Congress photo)

The Department of State grew slowly during the interwar years. Between 1920 and 1930, the domestic work force increased from 708 to only 714, the Foreign Service from 514 to 633, and annual expenditures from $13.6 million to $14 million. The functions of the Foreign Service did not change materially. Its members devoted themselves to representation, negotiation, reporting, protection of American citizens and their interests, trade promotion, and consular tasks. One historian has described the generally backward state of the organization when Secretary Hull assumed control. "In 1933 the Department was small, placid, comfortably adjusted to the lethargic diplomacy of the preceding decade, and suffused with



Charles Evans Hughes served as Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925. His opening speech to the Washington conference on the limitation of armaments proposed naval restrictions that "sank" more ships in 15 minutes "than all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries." He later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. (Department of State photo)

Cartoonist Clifford K. Berryman views recognition of the Soviet Union. (Library of Congress photo)

William C. Bullitt served as the first American Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1933–36); he was also Ambassador to France (1936–40). (Department of State photo)

A perennial problem in American foreign policy. (Library of Congress photo)

habits of thought that reached back to a still earlier day." Overseas missions were in a comparable state. "The Foreign Service—genteel, slow-moving, and complacent—also cherished its ties with the past." Although many highly qualified people served at home and abroad, their presence did not in itself insure effective institutional performance: "Individual competence is seldom proof against outmoded procedures and relaxed standards of accomplishment." The United States still lacked an apparatus for the conduct of foreign relations appropriate to the modern era.

The neglect of foreign relations that characterized the interwar years dissipated rapidly with the onset of the Second World War; the undeniable menace of Hitler's Germany and its partners, Italy and Japan, forced the U.S. Government to increasingly interventionist policy, particularly given the Axis victories of 1939–41, when the nation again adopted neutrality. President Franklin Roosevelt took the initiative: He launched rearmament, authorized the sale of destroyers to Great Britain in return for leases on certain bases in the western Atlantic, and eventually provided wholesale economic assistance to the anti-

Ruth Bryan Owen, daughter of William Jennings Bryan, was America's first woman Chief of Mission. She served as Minister to Denmark from 1933 to 1936.
(Department of State photo)

German coalition of Great Britain and the Soviet Union by means of the Lend-Lease Act (1941). Nevertheless, the United States did not enter the war until the Japanese air raid against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The American intervention of 1941, like that of 1917, committed the United States to another period of intense international activity, an outcome that added greatly to the tasks of the Department of State. It accepted responsibility for evacuating Americans from combat zones, representing the interests of belligerents in enemy countries, assisting prisoner-of-war exchanges, maintaining liaison with the International Red Cross, and dealing with refugees.

During the war the most notable increase in business within the Department occurred in the economic field. Officials of the Department helped coordinate the activities of various wartime agencies set up to mobilize the nation for total war and to assist in the reconstruction of liberated territories. The Department also created a complex system to provide efficient international communications, a vital aspect of waging global war.

To perform its tasks, the foreign policy community grew at an unequalled rate. In 1940 the Department had 1,128 domestic employees, and it survived on total expenditures of $24 million, of which less than $3 million was spent at home. By 1945 the staff had grown to 3,767 people, and the budget for all operations had risen to about $50 million. Recruiting for the career Foreign Service was suspended during the war, but a Foreign Service Auxiliary was created to provide additional assistance. It sought experienced elders with necessary qualifications and young people with abilities comparable to those of successful prewar candidates for the Foreign Service. By January 1946, the Auxiliary included 976 people.

To manage international tasks that would not be taken on by the Department, a number of wartime agencies came into existence. Among them were the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of War Information, the Office of Strategic Services, the Lend-Lease Administration, and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

And yet, as during the First World War, the President largely ignored the Secretary's advice on policy; the Department of State confined itself mostly to day-to-day operations. Secretary Hull proved influential only in one area—preparation of plans for postwar international organization. This situation stemmed from the Department's failure to organize for fully effective performance in wartime. Wartime decisions required coordination of political ends and military means, but the Department of State lacked the means—expertise and institutions—to exert dominant influence on the shaping of grand strategy. Like President Wilson before him, President Roosevelt turned to a coterie of trusted advisers, among them Harry Hopkins, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, General George C. Marshall, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Although Secretary Hull was usually informed of important decisions, he rarely participated in the great wartime conferences at which the leaders of the grand alliance forged the victory of 1945. His inability to gain the President's full confidence kept the Department from a reasonable part in many major decisions. It is not surprising that Secretary Hull should have commented bitterly toward the end of his service: "When I accepted this office, I knew that I would be misrepresented, lied about, let down, and that there would be humiliations that no man in private life could accept and keep his self-respect. But I made up my mind in advance that I would accept all these things and just do my job."

In 1943 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. of Virginia became Under Secretary of State and immediately began to plan a major reorganization of the Department of State, an enterprise that stemmed directly from wartime

Another Man Behind the Throne

Harry Hopkins spent his earlier career as a social worker. He came to Washington in 1933 as one of the New Dealers. His first assignment was to administer employment relief; he headed the Work Projects Administration. In 1938 he became President Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce.

As World War II approached, President Roosevelt turned increasingly to Hopkins for crucial assignments. He first served as the administrator of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and then moved to the White House as a special assistant. In this capacity he was sent on secret missions to serve as the President's eyes and ears. In July 1941 he went to Moscow to work out cooperation with Stalin after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. He attended all of the great wartime summit conferences such as Casablanca (1943) and Yalta (1945) held to coordinate the strategy and policy of the "grand alliance"—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Closely attuned to the needs and desires of the President, he also gained the confidence of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin. His last public service, after the death of President Roosevelt, was to visit Moscow in a successful effort to obtain Russian cooperation in creating the United Nations.

embarrassments. One journalist summarized the situation aptly: "Notwithstanding the personal prestige of the Secretary of State [Hull], the organization he heads has only to be mentioned in almost any circle, American or foreign, to arouse either doubt, despair, or derision." Stettinius' reorganization marked the dividing line between the old Department of State and the present agency. He began the process of making adjustments to insure that the Department would participate effectively in shaping the nation's foreign relations during the difficult postwar era that lay ahead.

Stettinius concentrated on certain key deficiencies of the Department, particularly unsound division of responsibility for certain important functions, inadequate means of obtaining and disseminating information, and ineffective long-range planning. On December 20, 1944, shortly after Stettinius succeeded Hull as Secretary of State, he issued Department Order 1301, which concentrated similar functions in the same office and related offices under a senior official, either the Under Secretary or one of six Assistant Secretaries.

To coordinate the work of the Department, insure follow-through, and conduct long-range planning, Order 1301 created several new organizations. A Staff Committee consisting of the Secretary and his principal subordinates became the chief managerial group. The task of making initial investigations of policy matters and controlling interoffice projects was given to a Coordinating Committee. A Joint Secretariat was charged with monitoring Department activity to insure efficient action on decisions. Finally a Policy Committee and a Committee on Postwar Problems were created to undertake long-range planning.

Secretary Stettinius also recognized the need to improve the management of functions that overlapped the jurisdictions of the traditional geographic bureaus. New bureaus were set up to deal with trade relations, cultural diplomacy, and public information. Another important functional organization came into being in September 1945—the Interim Research and Intelligence Service, the forerunner of the present-day Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These innovations minimized fragmentation of jurisdiction that so frequently immobilized the Department when quick decisions were required in a crisis.

Certain other steps that continued the modernization of the Department were taken during the service of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, who succeeded Stettinius in July 1945, shortly after Harry S. Truman became President. The most important activity was to gather several temporary wartime organizations into the permanent structure of the Department, especially those that dealt with international economic affairs. In August 1946 the Department created an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. This official teamed with an existing Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs to supervise economic activities and to establish effective relations with certain international institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

To modernize personnel practices, Congress passed the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which became law on August 13, 1946. It was intended to "improve, strengthen, and expand the Foreign Service . . . and to consolidate and revise the laws relating to its administration." To improve the administration of the Foreign Service, the act of 1946 established a Director General and a Board of the Foreign Service, and to maintain the principle of competitive entrance it set up a Board of Examiners. It also provided for improvements in assignments policy, promotion procedures, allowances and benefits, home leave, and the retirement system. Recognizing the growing importance of expertise in certain critical areas, it created the Foreign Service Reserve for people needed in specialist categories such as lawyers, doctors, economists, and intelligence analysts. Finally the act converted the Foreign Service School into the modern Foreign Service Institute to offer advanced training for Foreign Service officers in subjects of particular importance to the Department.

The new Department of State emerged from World War II better prepared to play a leading role in the foreign policy process and fully aware that the tasks ahead loomed more difficult than any encountered in earlier years. In July 1945, Secretary Byrnes recognized the extent of the postwar challenge. "Today there is no doubt that the people of this war-ravaged Earth want to live in a free and peaceful world. The supreme task of statesmanship in the world over is to help them understand that they can have peace and freedom only if they tolerate and respect the rights of others to opinions, feelings, and way of life which they do not and cannot share."

As President Harry S. Truman watches, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., signs the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on June 26, 1945. (Department of State photo)

The Age of Global Leadership, 1947–Present

In April 1947 the Department of State occupied new quarters located in a section of Washington, D.C., known as Foggy Bottom. This move coincided with one of the most striking departures in the history of American foreign relations. The United States and the Soviet Union, allies during the Second World War, had emerged from that conflict as the sole world powers. By 1947 efforts to maintain cooperation had broken down. President Harry S. Truman, working closely with two Secretaries of State, George C. Marshall of Pennsylvania and Dean G. Acheson of Maryland, took decisive steps to preclude Soviet aggression against regions in which the United States had vital interests.

A leading expert on Soviet affairs in the Department of State, George F. Kennan (soon to become head of the Policy Planning Staff), developed the intellectual basis for what became known as the policy of "containment." Kennan concluded that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." This concept inspired a series of successful initiatives undertaken from 1947 to 1950 in which the Department of State played a leading role.

The first step was the "Truman Doctrine" of March 1947. Reacting to fear that Greece and Turkey might fall victim to subversion for lack of support from friendly nations, President Truman asked Congress to authorize $400 million in emergency assistance to the two nations. To justify this course he stated: "I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way." The key to preventing overthrow of free nations was to attack the conditions of "misery and want" that nurtured totalitarianism.

Very soon this general idea was applied to Western Europe. In June 1947, Secretary Marshall proposed the extension of massive economic assistance to the devastated nations of Europe, saying that the policy

Secretary of State George C. Marshall (1947–49) proposed the European recovery program, better known as the Marshall plan.
(Department of State photo)

of the United States was not directed "against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the existence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist." Congress later authorized the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall plan. An investment of about $13 billion in Europe during the next few years resulted in an extraordinarily rapid and durable reconstruction of Western Europe.

It soon became apparent that there must be a political-military dimension to the policy of containment. In June 1948, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, a strong proponent of bipartisan foreign policy, sponsored a resolution in the Senate that set the nation's course. It called for "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and

collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the [United Nations] Charter." President Truman had already applied this concept to Latin America. The Rio pact, signed in September 1947, provided that "an armed attack by any State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack." Collective security was invoked once again in the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in Washington in April 1949, it created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Rio pact and the NATO pact ended the policy of no entangling alliances. Economic assistance to endangered regions and collective defense agreements with likeminded nations became the principal means of insuring containment of the Soviet bloc.

Dean Acheson was the architect of postwar collective security. While he was Secretary of State (1949–53), the United States negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty, signed treaties of peace and mutual defense with Japan, and committed its armed forces to the defense of South Korea.
(Photo by Fabian Bachrach)

During the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61), the United States ratified a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties designed to extend the wall of containment around the Soviet Union and its allies. Among these arrangements were the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); and bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippine Republic.

At times the United States was forced to counter unexpected probes along the dividing line between the free nations and their rivals. In 1948 the United States and its European allies fended off a dangerous threat to the western zones of occupied Berlin. When the Soviet Union interdicted land access, the city received supplies by means of a massive airlift. Eventually the Russians were forced to lift the blockade. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, the United States sponsored a "police action" under the auspices of the United Nations to curb the aggressor. After a long struggle the United Nations Command preserved the independence of South Korea. In 1954 the United States took a strong stand in favor of Taiwan when the Chinese People's Republic bombarded certain islands off the Chinese mainland. In 1955 assistance began to flow to the new nation of South Vietnam, created after the withdrawal of France from Indochina.

The evolution of containment had remarkable effects on the agencies most concerned with American foreign relations. Soon after the Second World War, Congress created a new institutional structure to reach sound decisions relating to national security and to put those decisions into effect. The National Security Act of 1947 recognized that the President must have the ability to control national security policy and that to achieve this object there must be "a single, top-ranking body to form and correlate national policy." The institution founded to perform this function was the National Security Council (NSC).

The creation of the NSC did not displace the Secretary of State as the President's senior adviser on international questions; it simply insured that all concerned agencies would make cooperative contributions to the decisionmaking process in appropriate measure. The principal participants in the NSC, acting at the direction of the President, are the Vice President and representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and, on occasion, interdepartmental groups ranging in nature from small informal committees to large, highly organized councils. Proliferation of interagency organizations reflected the fact that few national-security issues could be dealt with by only one agency.

The NSC structure for making national security decisions provided an institutional vehicle through which the Department of State could exert a continuing influence on the nation's "grand strategy," that is, the systematic design for insuring national security that pulls together the basic means of exercising national power—political, economic, psychological, and military measures—something that the Department had found difficult to accomplish during the troubled years between 1914 and 1945.

Nevertheless, the Department of State realizes its full potential in the new institutional context only if the Secretary of State gains the confidence of the President. The Department's signal contributions to the containment policy stemmed from close associations between President Truman and Secretaries Marshall and Acheson. Truman was always anxious to complete action on important questions; he wanted to make his decision as soon as he had a sound basis. Secretary Acheson, notes his biographer, "could always provide an adequate basis, or its appearance, before any rival body. . . . In the race with time, which was the key to influence over the President, Acheson was unbeatable." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles established effective communication with President Eisenhower after 1953, thereby insuring that the Department of State continued to receive a hearing at the White House.

John Foster Dulles extended American alliances to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As Secretary of State (1953–59), he traveled half a million miles and visited 60 countries. He coined such colorful descriptions of his policies as "liberation," "going to the brink," "agonizing reappraisal," and "massive retaliation."
(Department of State photo)

The revolution in American foreign policy that occurred after the Second World War greatly affected the position of the Secretary of State. Before 1941 domestic political considerations rather than the need for expertise in foreign affairs usually guided the President in his choice of the senior foreign policy adviser, but after 1945 most of the Secretaries were selected because they possessed broad experience and technical skills deemed essential to effective performance. Before 1941 Secretaries usually remained in Washington, depending on ambassadors or executive agents to conduct negotiations overseas, but after 1945 Secretaries traveled extensively. Before 1941 Secretaries did not usually concentrate on the management of the Department of State, but after 1945 they had to give large amounts of time to administration. The burdens of office have greatly increased, but there has been a significant compensation. Secretaries have gained in prestige, a consequence of the high priority accorded to foreign relations in recent years.

Department of State Building

The present home of the Department of State is at 2200 C Street, Northwest. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower joined with Secretary Dulles in laying the cornerstone. The President used the same trowel that was used by George Washington to lay the cornerstone of the U.S. Capitol in 1793. A sealed metal box containing a selection of historic documents was deposited in the cornerstone. The building was completed in 1961.

This structure covers four square blocks and has seven floors of office space. An eighth floor is used for official functions such as diplomatic dinners and receptions. These rooms are furnished largely with a growing collection of antiques and art treasures provided by the American people on loan or as gifts.

Extensive international activity after the Second World War led to great changes in the Department of State. Members of the Foreign Service performed duties that went far beyond the traditional missions of political representation, negotiation, and reporting. Knowledge of varied scientific, economic, cultural, and social issues became essential. In 1970 a Department publication, *Diplomacy for the 70's*, drew attention to this development. It noted that the agency now had to conduct "critically important programs for promoting our commercial exports, for concessional sales of agricultural commodities, for narcotics control, for military and development aid, for the inspection and licensing of airline routes, for cooperation in the peaceful applications of atomic energy, for scientific and technological exchange, for coordinating international monetary policy, and for communicating directly with people of other countries through the media of press, radio, and television."

To provide an adequate institutional framework for its varied responsibilities, many of which could not be accommodated in the existing geographic bureaus, the Department established many new functional organizations. As of 1980 there were 14 such units, each headed by an Assistant Secretary of State or an official of comparable rank, as against five geographic bureaus. Functional bureaus created since the Second World War cover such diverse concerns as Intelligence and Research, Congressional Relations, Politico-Military Affairs, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Certain other functions earlier housed in the Department of State are now the responsibility of other organizations. The U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA) manages international informational activities and cultural relations. Foreign economic assistance is now in the hands of the Agency for International Development (AID). Another vital enterprise—arms control negotiations—is the principal task of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

To assist the Secretary of State the Department now has a large team of central managers. The Deputy Secretary of State serves when necessary as the Acting Secretary and, with the Counselor of the Department, is available for special assignments. Four Under Secretaries of State oversee important functional areas—political affairs; economic affairs; management; and security assistance, science, and technology. Special support for the Secretary comes from the Executive Secretariat, a unit set up to control information flow and to follow up decisions, and from the Policy Planning Staff.

Administrative problems also materialized overseas when many agencies of the U.S. Government entered the foreign field. This influx ultimately caused jurisdictional disputes, disorderly management, and widespread inefficiency. To restore order President Eisenhower issued a series of Executive orders that established the Ambassador as the supervisor for all operations within his country. The chief of mission became the leader of a "country team" that included representatives of all organizations with operational responsibilities, for example, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Information Service (the precedessor agency of USICA), the Department of Agriculture, and the Peace Corps. Further improvement occurred in 1966 when President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk arranged for "country directors" in the geographic bureaus, who supported chiefs of mission; they communicated policy guidance and mobilized operational and administrative support for the country team.

The revolution in foreign policy produced much greater growth in the Department of State than in any previous period. A few statistics graphically illustrate this pattern. The domestic work force enlarged from 1,128 in 1940 to a postwar high of 8,609 in 1950. The total declined to 6,983 in 1970, but rose to 8,433 in 1980, still below the level of 1950. The Foreign Service expanded at a similar rate. From a mere 840 in 1940 it jumped to a high of 7,710 in 1950. The total number in all categories of the Foreign Service in 1980 was 5,861. The budget of the Department also rose spectacularly, even if inflation is taken into account. In 1940 the total expenditure was $24 million but by 1950 it reached $350.9 million. After a decline to $246.6 million in 1960, expenditures climbed to $447.8 million in 1970 and to $2,354,139,275.69 in 1980. Even so the Department of State has the lowest budget of all Cabinet departments.

After the accomplishments of the immediate postwar years, the Department of State suffered a crippling blow when it became the prime target of Senator Joseph McCarthy's search for subversives in the U.S. Government. In February 1950, shortly after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons and Mao Zedong seized power in China, the Wisconsin Senator launched his anti-Communist crusade with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. Depicting the international position of the United States in the most dire terms, he insisted: "How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in the government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man." He announced that he had a list of 205 subversives—"a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department." Senator McCarthy never made public such a list. A number of the most experienced Foreign Service officers—notably the Department's corps of Far Eastern experts—were forced out of the Department or their reputations were otherwise seriously damaged. Senator McCarthy never proved any of his irresponsible allegations.

McCarthy's allegations had a lasting effect on those who remained in the Department. John W. Ford, a security officer at the time, has since noted that "few people who lived through the McCarthy era in the Department of State can ever forget the fear, intimidation, and sense of outrage which permeated Foggy Bottom." In 1978 the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom, said: "I can recall the

Loy W. Henderson began his diplomatic career as Vice Consul in Dublin in 1922. His 39 years of service included assignments as Minister to Iraq (1943–45), Ambassador to India (1948–51) and to Iran (1951–54), and Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (1955). The Department's international conference room was dedicated to him in 1976.
(Department of State photo)

shock of the taunts and suspicions leveled at the State Department and those who served in it. It must be satisfying, but not full recompense, for those who suffered in that period to have our nation now realize that they were substantially right."

The notion that the Department served the nation's enemies lingered on for many years. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington put his finger on one reason for the tendency to level unjustified criticism at the Department. "We know that the State Department has been a target for all of the problems of the cold war because it is called the State Department—it is the Foreign Office. It is a very popular target—and does not have any constituents." The relative absence of powerful and assertive support from organized interest groups, especially in comparison with most other major agencies, renders the Department of State vulnerable to irresponsible charges, especially in periods of international stress. It usually can be attacked without fear of serious retaliation.

While the Department struggled with McCarthyism, it also sought to modernize its personnel practices. Postwar growth produced what one historian described as "inertia, inflexibility, and loss of efficiency in the use of personnel." Stanton Griffis, a businessman who served as Ambassador to several countries, later satirized the confused situation. Overseas missions constituted "a fantastic network of men, women, and typewriters, who report [on] . . . political, economic, labor, and agricultural conditions." These reports then went to Washington, where they were immediately filed away. Then "the home team, having properly disposed of the information from the field, proceeds to write its own endless reports to go forward to the same ultimate fate in the embassies throughout the world."

The personnel problems of the Department of State attracted the attention of a commission, headed by former President Hoover, created to investigate all aspects of government organization after World War II. In 1949 the commission called for reforms to eliminate one important source of difficulty—invidious distinctions between the Foreign Service and the civil servants who staffed the Department's headquarters in Washington.

Several years later, in 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Henry M. Wriston, the President of Brown University, to undertake a study of the Department's personnel practices. Dulles drew attention to a number of concerns, among them poor morale because of managerial shortcomings, low intake into the Foreign Service, and inequities that stemmed from differences in the treatment of different categories of employees. After examining these matters, President Wriston called for integration of many Civil Service employees into the Foreign Service. There followed several years of "Wristonization"; by the end of 1957 the Foreign Service had more than doubled in size to 3,436 officers. By August 1959, 1,523 Foreign Service officers held positions in the Department, a device intended to improve communications between Washington and the missions overseas and to fulfill the legal requirement that Foreign Service officers spend a portion of their careers at home.

Although the reforms of the early postwar years served the Department well, the march of events during the 1950s and especially the 1960s posed new difficulties. The innovative concept of containment began to lose some of its utility as a rough balance of power was established in Europe and East Asia. As East-West tensions subsided somewhat, new strains developed along a North-South axis. After the Second World War, which completed the destruction of the great European colonial powers, ancient peoples everywhere in Africa and Asia recaptured their sovereignty. A "revolution in rising expectations" throughout the Third World spawned new international issues that greatly complicated the task of statecraft.

The need to make significant changes in the foreign policy of the United States became fully apparent during the war in South Vietnam. The modest intervention that began in 1955 after the departure of France from Indochina turned into a major enterprise during President Johnson's Administration (1963–69). In 1968, after 3 years of warfare that led to the introduction of over 500,000 American troops into South Vietnam, President Johnson decided to disengage from a struggle that had lost popular support at home.

The election of President Richard M. Nixon in 1968 led to important changes in direction. In February 1970, acting on the advice of Henry A. Kissinger, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, President Nixon presented a report to Congress entitled *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s*, in which he described certain basic changes that had taken place in the world since 1945. The world, he believed, had largely recovered from the damage of the Second World War; many new nations had come into existence in Africa and Asia; the monolithic structure of international communism had been fractured because of developments in China and Eastern Europe; the United States no longer possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons; and a significant moderation had occurred in international ideological conflict. Given these developments, President Nixon continued, the United States in the future should rely more heavily on partnership with likeminded peoples; it should maintain sufficient military

Diplomatic and Consular Posts 1781–1980

	Diplomatic	Consular
1781	4	3
1790	2	10
1800	6	52
1810	4	60
1820	7	83
1830	15	141
1840	20	152
1850	27	197
1860	33	282
1870	36	318
1880	35	303
1890	41	323
1900	41	318
1910	48	324
1920	45	368
1930	57	299
1940	58	264
1950	74	179
1960	99	166
1970	117	122
1980	133	100

President Carter and Human Rights

President Carter made human rights one of the cornerstones of his foreign policy. In his Inaugural Address, delivered on January 20, 1977, he set the tone for his later activity in this respect.

"To be true to ourselves, we must be true to others. We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our nation earns is essential to our strength.

"The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical condition but for basic human rights.

"The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane."

strength to support its foreign policy while at the same time seeking arms control and disarmament; and it should constantly manifest "willingness to negotiate," abandoning the postwar tendency to reject the likelihood of successful diplomatic contacts with Communist nations.

President Nixon, acting on these principles, pursued two important enterprises that culminated in 1972. In February he visited Peking, setting in motion a long-term movement toward normalization of relations with the Chinese People's Republic. In May he traveled to the Soviet Union and signed agreements that contained the results of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). New negotiations were begun to extend arms control and disarmament measures (SALT II). These developments inaugurated a period of "detente" that accorded with a general tendency among the American people to favor a lowered profile in world affairs after the chastening experience in Vietnam that ended in 1975 with the last withdrawal of American personnel.

Improvements in relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, signaling a possible end to the cold war, did not lead to general improvement in the international climate. The international economy experienced considerable instability, leading to a significant modification of the international financial system that had been set up at the end of World War II. A keystone of that system was a stable U.S. dollar, to which other nations pegged their currencies. The dollar eventually came under severe attack, especially after adverse developments in the international balance of payments. In 1971 the dollar was devalued, a decision that inaugurated a period of unstable currency exchange rates. Two years later the international economy suffered another blow when, after Israel and Egypt fought a fourth war, the Arab oil-producing nations instituted a boycott of oil shipments to important consumers, particularly in Europe and East Asia. Henry A. Kissinger, appointed Secretary of State in October 1973, became deeply involved in efforts to resolve the longstanding dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

After President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he and his Secretaries of State, Cyrus R. Vance of New York and Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, continued the search for further arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and for restoration of political stability in the turbulent Middle East. President Carter's most distinctive modification of general foreign policy was his energetic promotion of international human rights.

As the nation passed through the 1970s the Department of State came to grips with certain new challenges as it made adjustments to the changing pattern of world politics. Among these challenges four deserve special mention. Continuing attempts have been made to achieve effective managerial and personnel arrangements. The Congress has asserted considerable influence in the foreign policy process, a significant departure from prior practice. Efforts have been undertaken to meet the requirements of equal employment opportunity. Finally, an outburst of international terrorism has exposed the Foreign Service to great danger in many parts of the world.

Growing concern about the efficiency of the Department of State during the late 1960s ultimately led to a major self-study conducted in 1970. Thirteen task forces of Foreign Service and Department employees thoroughly investigated all activities and produced the report, *Diplomacy for the 70's*, that made many recommendations. The task forces traced the difficulties of the Department to "weakness in the area of management capability." The agency still lacked the modern managerial know-how required for efficient operations in the complex environment of the modern world. "Because of the diversity and complexity of our overseas activities, effective coordination calls for a wide range of management skills and management tools. The traditional reliance of Foreign Service officers on experience and tradition is no longer good enough." What was required? "The diplomacy of the seventies calls for a new breed of diplomat-manager, just as able as the best of the old school, but equipped with up-to-date techniques and backed by a Department organized on modern management principles."

Members of the Foreign Service had been bombarded ever since the Second World War with call after call for change in their professional attitudes and activities. For example, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, noted in 1964 that a contemporary Foreign Service officer "must not only know how to use the traditional tools of diplomacy, but . . . must also be expert in the new instruments of foreign policy such as economic aid and cultural exchanges." To maintain professional proficiency the modern diplomat must constantly acquire additional education. "If there is a continuous process of improvement in the people involved in implementing foreign policy, the procedures and techniques employed will be improved as a natural byproduct."

Diplomacy for the 70's called for "a new spirit in the Department." One of the task forces insisted that the times required "a tremendous effort . . . to shake off old habits, old ways of doing things, old ways of dealing with each other. What we are proposing is a change of outlook

and method." The report concluded: "The traditional mode of reflection and detachment cultivated by diplomats trained in the old school must be reinforced by a more dynamic and aggressive style if the Department is to play the role which the President expects of it."

Not everyone welcomed such views. One historian notes that some Foreign Service officers opposed radical change, considering themselves "an embattled and misunderstood elite who functioned as political reporters and policy planners." Rather than retooling for changing responsibilities, these officers sometimes argued through their professional organization, the American Foreign Service Association, that the Foreign Service should be given increased political responsibility by placing career officers in high-level positions at home and abroad.

The conflict between those who defended the older model and those who wanted to modernize the Foreign Service found expression in a long-standing dispute over whether Foreign Service officers should be generalists or specialists. Those opposed to change argued that the diplomat should continue to rely primarily on general experience and intuition. Those interested in reform claimed that the future belonged to specialists with advanced training. Henry Wriston called for balance. Specialized skills were essential in the modern era, but it seemed evident that specialists tended "to become so narrow as to lose perspective; then each specialism conceives of its own bailiwick as 'most vital.'" Wriston concluded that "no rule of thumb can establish the proper balance" between general and special skills. He believed that the best specialists would "broaden rather than narrow their interests with experience and on becoming senior officers [would] prove to be good generalists."

This outlook is reflected in the most recent attempt to resolve the personnel problems of the Department of State—the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Its principal provisions represent a turn away from the effort to establish an integrated Foreign Service; henceforth employees of the Department of State who are not liable for overseas service, including specialists formerly placed in the Foreign Service Reserve, will be members of the Civil Service. When the act is put into effect, it will produce a Foreign Service of 6,850 people and a domestic work force of 3,800 people, a total of approximately 10,650 employees. The act seeks to encourage qualities in the Foreign Service that are essential to the modern practice of diplomacy. Under Secretary of State David D. Newsom summarized these qualities in 1978: "An understanding of our own nation; a balanced sensitivity to other societies and peoples; a firm grasp of the subject matter of international relations; and the skill to bring this knowledge together in advancing both the interests of our country and the establishment of working understandings with others."

The principle of executive predominance in the conduct of foreign relations was not seriously challenged until recent times, but the need to finance economic assistance and other important aspects of an active foreign policy has upgraded the role of Congress in the foreign policy process. Recognizing this development, the Department of State designated an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations in 1949 to improve liaison with Capitol Hill. Bipartisan approaches to foreign affairs minimized executive-legislative tensions during the earlier postwar years, but burgeoning public opposition to the war in Vietnam during the 1960s caused Congress to question executive behavior and even to sponsor international activities on its own.

The most significant initiative of Congress has been in the field of international human rights. Seeking to stimulate more active support of oppressed people, Congress enacted a series of statutes during the 1970s that placed legislative constraints on various types of economic and military assistance to governments that consistently violated internationally accepted human rights. Differences of view between the legislative and executive branches narrowed when President Jimmy Carter expressed strong support for an active human rights policy.

In other respects, however, President Carter encountered congressional resistance. The Senate manifested considerable reluctance to accept a treaty providing for the return of the Panama Canal Zone to Panama before finally giving its consent. Even greater Senatorial doubts about the SALT II Treaty, reinforced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, caused the President to postpone further consideration of the agreement.

During the 1960s the activities of the civil rights movement in the United States led to the passage of legislation designed to insure equal employment opportunity in the Federal Government, and the Department of State undertook to meet its responsibilities in this respect. Much needed to be done. Although women and members of minorities had long formed part of the Department of State, they were seriously underrepresented, particularly in the higher ranks.

The Department of State first appointed women to full-time positions in 1874, but they were deemed unqualified for other than clerical duties. In 1905, for example, Assistant Secretary Frederick Van Dyne said: "The greatest obstacle to the employment of women as diplomatic agents is their well known inability to keep a secret." The first woman to achieve supervisory rank was Margaret Hanna, who

Expenditures 1781–1980

Year	Amount
1781	$57,309*
1800	294,894.31
1810	118,782.07
1820	340,698.03
1830	432,200.69
1840	890,273.22
1850	716,521.03
1860	1,264,946.22
1870	1,681,174.53
1880	1,343,241.80
1890	1,773,066.75
1900	3,356,173.87
1910	4,909,557.77
1920	13,590,288.51
1930	13,986,172.82
1940	24,003,329.49
1950	350,855,773.75
1960	246,625,626.92
1970	447,753,719.37
1980	2,354,139,275.69

* "Exclusive of Contingencies."

entered the Department as a clerk in 1895 and became Chief of the Correspondence Bureau in 1918. A few other women rose to managerial positions during the 1920s, including Ruth Shipley, who assumed the leadership of the Passport Division in 1921.

The first woman to enter the Foreign Service, Lucile Atcherson, was not appointed until 1922, after the First World War. The first entrant after the passage of the Rogers Act was Pattie H. Field in 1925. Continuing doubts about the ability of women to endure the trials of duty overseas worked against acceptance of women in the Foreign Service. After Atcherson and Field were appointed, a senior diplomat suggested that "it would be a wise thing to refrain from taking any more women until we can form an idea of their usefulness from observation of those we have already taken in." To exclude women who scored high on written examinations, another official observed that examining boards might award failing grades on oral examinations.

Eugenie M. Anderson was the first woman Ambassador (Denmark, 1949–53) and the first woman to sign a treaty on behalf of the United States. (Department of State photo)

The first women given political appointments to high-level diplomatic positions occurred during the 1930s. In 1933 President Roosevelt named Ruth Bryan Owen, the daughter of former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, as Minister to Denmark, and in 1937 Florence Jaffray Harriman was appointed Minister to Norway. Career women did not attain ambassadorial rank until after the Second World War. The third woman to enter the Foreign Service, Frances E. Willis, was made Ambassador to Switzerland (1953–57). She later served in Norway and Ceylon. The first woman career diplomat to become an Assistant Secretary of State was Ambassador Carol C. Laise, who became head of the Bureau of Public Affairs in 1973. She later served as Director General of the Foreign Service.

Blacks were similarly underrepresented in the work force of the Department. As in the case of women, blacks sometimes served in the lower ranks but rarely became supervisors. The first black appointed to the rank of Minister was Ebenezer D. Bassett, who went to Haiti in 1869. James Milton Turner was made Minister to Liberia in 1871. The best known black abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, became Minister to Haiti and Charge d'Affaires to Santo Domingo in 1889. It became common practice to assign blacks to these countries, but few were sent elsewhere.

The first black to enter the Foreign Service was Clifford R. Wharton (1925), and he was also the first career diplomat of his race to serve as chief of mission, becoming Minister to Romania in 1958 and Ambassador to Norway in 1961. Like the women who entered the Foreign Service during the 1920s, Wharton experienced discrimination. When he decided to take the competitive examination for the Foreign Service, he discovered that his prospective associates "couldn't care less; they didn't want me in the Department of State." His early diplomatic career was spent mostly in posts traditionally reserved for blacks, especially Liberia. Wharton remembers having commented smilingly to a personnel officer after receiving an undesirable assignment in 1946: "You're not only discriminating against us [with] in the Service, but you're exporting discrimination abroad. . . ."

Frances E. Willis was the first woman Foreign Service officer to be appointed a U.S. Ambassador (Switzerland, 1953–57), the first to attain the rank of Career Minister, and the only one to be named Career Ambassador. She served as Ambassador to Norway (1957–61) and to Ceylon (1961–64). (Department of State photo)

Clifton R. Wharton was a clerk in the Consular Commercial Office when he took the first Foreign Service examination (1925). He became Third Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Liberia and later was Minister to Romania (1958) and Ambassador to Norway (1961). He was the first black Foreign Service officer and the first to serve as Chief of Mission to a European country. (Department of State photo)

Carl T. Rowan, with his family, signs his commission as Ambassador to Finland in 1963. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (1961–63) and Director of the U.S. Information Agency (1964–65). (Department of State photo)

Hispanics have served in the Department of State since 1820, when Joseph M. Espada of New York became a consular agent in Mexico, but like women and blacks they have been underrepresented up to the present. Ramón Leon Sánchez of Florida was made U.S. consul at Cartagena, Colombia, in 1840. An Hispanic, James Viosca of California, and his son, James Viosca, Jr., served successively as consuls at La Paz, Mexico, from 1877 to 1906.

The first Hispanic chief of mission was Romualdo Pacheco of California, who became Minister to a group of Central American states in 1890. No other Hispanic achieved comparable rank until William E. Gonzales of California became Minister to Cuba in 1913 and to Peru in 1919. Twenty others have since served as chief of mission, four of whom were career Foreign Service officers. Horacio Rivero, Jr., of California was the first Hispanic to be named chief of mission to a European country—Spain in 1972. Mari-Luci Jaramillo was the first Hispanic woman to become chief of mission, going to Honduras as Ambassador in 1977.

Patterns of prejudice and discrimination, prevalent elsewhere as well as in the Department of State, finally attracted extensive critical attention during the 1960s, and important attempts have been made in recent years to insure equal opportunity through the workings of energetic affirmative action programs. During the 1970s Secretaries of State William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, and Cyrus R. Vance all devoted considerable attention to this effort.

One of Secretary Vance's earliest acts was to issue a statement to the Department in which he announced his intention to "exercise personal leadership in prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap . . . [and] in carrying out a continuing affirmative action program designed to promote equal opportunity for all applicants and all employees."

True to his pledge, Secretary Vance appointed an executive-level task force to spur affirmative action, but much remains to be accomplished before the Department achieves the goals established by recent Secretaries. Presumably there should be a reasonable relationship between the incidence of racial and ethnic groups in the general population and their representation in the Department of State. A look at the profile of the Foreign Service reveals great disparities. Women constitute slightly more than half of the general population but only 10.2% of the Foreign Service. About 12% of the population is black, but blacks constitute only 3.5% of the Foreign Service. Hispanics make up more than 5% of the population, but they are a minuscule 1.5% of the Foreign Service.

No development of recent years has been more troubling than the rise of terrorism as a political weapon aimed at Americans representing their country abroad. Numerous attacks on American posts overseas and frequent kidnappings and killings of Americans have occurred in recent years, adding a tragically large number of names to the list of those who have given their lives in the line of duty. In August 1968, Ambassador John Gordon Mein was assassinated in Guatemala, the first chief of mission to be murdered in the line of duty. Since then other Ambassadors have been killed in Sudan, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Kidnappings have occurred in places as widely separated as Zaire, Brazil, and Jordan.

The most serious of all such episodes was the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent detention of more than 50 hostages. This event brought home to the American people once again the extreme dangers that the Foreign Service must face in many assignments outside the country. The steadfast courage of the American hostages in Tehran and their families at home reflected the best traditions of the Department of State and the other agencies represented among the hostages.

An aerial view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran prior to its seizure and occupation in November 1979. (Department of State photo)

In the Line of Duty

Diplomatic service is not normally considered a hazardous profession. Nevertheless over 100 Americans have died or been killed while on active duty with the Foreign Service. Some fell victim to tropical disease, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions; many others died a hero's death in the midst of war, while saving lives, or at the hands of assassins.

To honor those who lost their lives "under heroic or tragic circumstances," the American Foreign Service Association in 1933 dedicated a plaque. Among the names . . .

William Palfrey, lost at sea, 1780
Abraham Hanson, African fever, Liberia, 1866
John F. Flint, drowned saving life, El Salvador, 1875
Victor F. W. Stanwood, murdered, Madagascar, 1888
Maddin Summers, exhaustion, Moscow, 1918
Douglass MacKiernan, killed by gunfire, Tibet, 1950
Barbara A. Robbins, killed in bombing of Embassy, Vietnam, 1965

That plaque, and a second one unveiled in 1973, are in the diplomatic lobby of the Department of State. In recent years, the names of those who have died of disease contracted at tropical posts have not been added. Yet the list continues to grow . . .

Ambassador John Gordon Mein, assassinated, Guatemala, 1968
John Paul Vann, killed in a helicopter in a night battle, Vietnam, 1972
Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and George Curtis Moore, murdered while held hostage, Sudan, 1973
John S. Patterson, murdered while held by kidnappers, Mexico, 1974
Ambassador Rodger P. Davies, killed by sniper fire during mob attack on Embassy, Cyprus, 1974
Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr., and Counselor Robert O. Waring, murdered en route to an appointment with the President-elect, Lebanon, 1976
Ambassador Adolph Dubs, killed while being held hostage, Afghanistan, 1979
CWO Bryan L. Ellis (U.S. Army) and Cpl. Stephen J. Crowley (USMC), killed during an attempted mob takeover of the Embassy, Pakistan, 1979.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance joins members of the Iran Working Group in the Department's Operations Center following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. (Department of State photo)

Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen (right) presents a valor award for "outstanding performance and bravery . . . in support of U.S. interests and citizens, December 1978 to February 1979" to Foreign Service officer Michael Metrinko in July 1979 in Tehran. Both Laingen and Metrinko are among the 52 Americans held hostage in Iran as of publication date. (Department of State photo)

After two centuries the Department of State—its offices and its people—comprise one of the world's nerve centers of human affairs. During the earliest days of the Republic, it made indispensable contributions to the preservation of our independence. Throughout the 19th century, as the United States changed gradually into a great power, the Department loyally supported the foreign policies associated with isolation, neutrality, and expansion. Across the 20th century, as Americans came to accept the responsibilities of leadership, the Department, like the nation it serves, has experienced remarkable growth in size, influence, and function.

Every era has its agenda of challenge, danger, and opportunity. Entering its third century, the Department of State must struggle with the problems of nuclear weapons, population explosion, depletion of natural resources, and the seemingly unmanageable acceleration of technological, social, and political change.

For two centuries the men and women of the Department have chosen this form of public service because they are deeply committeed to the search for solutions to the problems of tomorrow. Throughout the world they daily face the threat of disease, terrorism, war, kidnapping, and death. Along with these hazards come the normal demands of day-to-day problemsolving, decisionmaking, and coping with life at home or abroad. All things considered the people of the United States have been well served.

David F. Trask was born in Erie, Pennsylvania, in 1929. He received a B.A. degree from Wesleyan University (1951) and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard in 1952 and 1958. He served in the U.S. Army (1952–54) and from 1955 to 1966 was an instructor or assistant professor at Boston University, Wesleyan University, and the University of Nebraska. Dr. Trask was professor of history at the State University of New York from 1966 until May 1976, when he became Historian of the Department of State.

Dr. Trask is a member of the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, the National Council on Public History, and Phi Beta Kappa. He is also the Department of State's representative on the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.

His major publications are *The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917–1918* (1961), *General Tasker Howard Bliss and the "Sessions of the World," 1919* (1966), *Victory Without Peace: American Foreign Relations in the 20th Century* (1968), *World War I at Home* (1970), *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917–1918* (1972). He is the coauthor of *The Ordeal of World Power* (1975) and the coeditor of *A Bibliography of United States-Latin American Relations Since 1810* (1970).

Department Personnel 1781–1980

	Domestic	Overseas	Total
1781	4	10	14
1790	8	20	28
1800	10	62	72
1810	9	56	65
1820	16	95	111
1830	23	153	176
1840	38	170	208
1850	22	218	240
1860	42	281	323
1870	65	804	869
1880	80	977	1,057
1890	76	1,105	1,181
1900	91	1,137	1,228
1910	234	1,043	1,277
1920	708	514	1,222
1930	714	633	1,347
1940	1,128	840	1,968
1950	8,609	7,710	16,319
1960	7,116	6,178	13,294
1970	6,983	5,865	12,848
1980	8,433	5,861	13,962

NOTES: Domestic personnel includes both Civil Service and Foreign Service. Overseas personnel includes Foreign Service only.

Note on Authorities

This history depends heavily on certain authorities who have written about the U.S. Department of State. The two best histories of the Department are Gaillard Hunt, *The Department of State of the United States: Its History and Functions* (New Haven, 1914), and Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel* (New York, 1949). The two best works on the Foreign Service are William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, *The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions* (Washington, 1961), and Warren F. Ilchman, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States 1779–1939: A Study in Administrative History* (Chicago, 1961).

For information about the Secretaries of State consult the multi-volume series edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis and Robert F. Ferrell, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York, 1927–); Norman A. Graebner, ed., *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1961); Alexander DeConde, *The American Secretary of State: An Interpretation* (New York, 1962). For a useful reference work see John E. Findling, *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History* (Westport, 1980). For examples of recent specialized scholarship see Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," in John Braeman *et al.*, *Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy* (Columbus, 1971); Richard H. Werking, *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service 1890–1913* (Lexington, 1977); Rachel West, *The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War* (Athens, 1978); Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931* (Middletown, 1975).

Other references published by the Department of State are *The Secretaries of State: Portraits and Biographical Sketches*, *Homes of the Department of State, 1774–1976*, and *United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778–1973* and its supplement for 1973–74. ■

Secretaries for Foreign Affairs

Robert R. Livingston
1781–83

John Jay
1784–90

Secretaries of State

NOTE: Daniel Webster and James Gillespie Blaine were each appointed to two nonconsecutive terms as Secretary of State. Therefore, they are counted twice in this list.



1. Thomas Jefferson
1790–93

2. Edmund Randolph
1794–95



3. Timothy Pickering
1795–1800



4. John Marshall
1800–01



5. James Madison
1801–09


6. Robert Smith
1809–11


7. James Monroe
1811–17


8. John Quincy Adams
1817–25

9. Henry Clay
1825–29


10. Martin Van Buren
1829–31

11. Edward Livingston
1831–33

12. Louis McLane
1833–34

13. John Forsyth
1834–41


14. Daniel Webster
1841–43


15. Abel Parker Upshur
1843–44


16. John Caldwell Calhoun
1844–45

17. James Buchanan
1845–49


18. John Middleton Clayton
1849–50


19. Daniel Webster
1850–52

20. Edward Everett
1852–53


21. William Learned Marcy
1853–57

22. Lewis Cass
1857–60


23. Jeremiah Sullivan Black
1860–61



24. William Henry Seward
1861–69



25. Elihu Benjamin Washburne
1869

26. Hamilton Fish
1869–77

27. William Maxwell Evarts
1877–81



28. James Gillespie Blaine
1881



29. Frederick Theodore
Frelinghuysen 1881–85

30. Thomas Francis Bayard
1885–89

31. James Gillespie Blaine
1889–92

32. John Watson Foster
1892–93



33. Walter Quintin Gresham
1893–95

34. Richard Olney
1895–97

35. John Sherman
1897–98

36. William Rufus Day
1898



37. John Hay
1898–1905

38. Elihu Root
1905–09

39. Robert Bacon
1909

40. Philander Chase Knox
1909–13



41. William Jennings Bryan
1913–15



42. Robert Lansing
1915–20



43. Bainbridge Colby
1920–21



44. Charles Evans Hughes
1921–25

45. Frank Billings Kellogg
1925–29



46. Henry Lewis Stimson
1929–33

47. Cordell Hull
1933–44

48. Edward Reilly Stettinius, Jr.
1944–45



49. James Francis Byrnes
1945–47

50. George Catlett Marshall
1947–49

51. Dean Gooderham Acheson
1949–53

52. John Foster Dulles
1953–59

53. Christian Archibald Herter
1959–61

54. Dean Rusk
1961–69

55. William Pierce Rogers
1969–73

56. Henry Alfred Kissinger
1973–77

57. Cyrus Roberts Vance
1977–80



58. Edmund Sixtus Muskie
1980–81

Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr., was designated Secretary of State on December 16, 1980, by President-elect Reagan.

59. Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr.

Milestones of American Diplomacy

1778
Treaty of alliance with France, engineered by Benjamin Franklin, enabled the fledgling republic to continue its struggle for independence.

1783
Treaty of Paris—Great Britain recognized American independence and control over western lands as far as the Mississippi.

1783–86
First U.S. treaties of friendship and commerce—with France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Prussia, and Sweden—established U.S. tradition of nondiscrimination in foreign trade.

1795
Jay's treaty required Great Britain to remove troops from northwestern frontier; Pinckney's treaty with Spain opened mouth of Mississippi River to U.S. navigation.

1800
Treaty of Mortefontaine settled the 2-year undeclared naval war with France and put an end to the alliance.

1801
Jefferson, in first inaugural address, summarized U.S. policy as "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

1803
Louisiana Purchase removed foreign control of Mississippi's mouth and doubled U.S. territory.

1814
Treaty of Ghent ending War of 1812 provided means to settle remaining territorial disputes with Great Britain.

1819
Adams-Onis treaty with Spain, transferring Florida, extended the U.S. to present boundaries in southeast.

1823
Monroe Doctrine established U.S. policy of opposing European intervention or new colonization in Western Hemisphere.

1842
Webster-Ashburton treaty with Great Britain delimited northeastern U.S. (Maine) boundary.

1844
Treaty of Wang-hsia, first U.S.-Chinese agreement, granted U.S. commercial privileges and extraterritorial jurisdiction over Americans.

1846
Oregon treaty with Great Britain extended U.S. sole dominion to the Pacific.

1848
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, ending 1846–48 war with Mexico, confirmed U.S. claim to Texas and completed U.S. expansion to Pacific.

1858
Harris treaty first opened Japan to unsupervised foreign commerce.

1867
Alaska purchase ended Russian territorial presence and completed U.S. expansion on North American mainland.

1889
First International American Congress initiated system of collaboration among Western Hemisphere republics.

1898
Treaty of Paris, at end of Spanish-American War, gave United States Puerto Rico, Guam, and Philippines, expanding U.S. power into the Pacific.

1903
Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty conveyed to the U.S. the Panama Canal Zone.

1918
Allies and Germany accepted Wilson's 14 points as basis for just and lasting peace ending World War I.

1920
U.S. Senate rejected Treaty of Versailles with Germany, thus keeping the U.S. out of the League of Nations.

1934
Trade Agreements Act launched program of reciprocal tariff reduction leading to world efforts for trade liberalization after World War II.

1941
Atlantic Charter, joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 4 months before U.S. entered World War II, laid down principles of peace later adopted by United Nations—self-determination, economic cooperation, social progress, and disarmament.

1945
U.S. and 50 other countries founded the United Nations.

1947
U.S. and 22 other nations established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and completed first round of talks reducing world trade barriers.

1947
Truman Doctrine asserted U.S. policy of containing Soviet expansion through economic and military aid to threatened countries.

1947
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty) committed the U.S. and Latin American republics to aid one another to resist military aggression.

1947
Marshall plan of aid to Europe set foundation for economic cooperation among industrial democracies.

1948
Ninth International Conference of American States created the Organization of American States (OAS) to intensify U.S. and Latin American collaboration in all fields.

1948
NATO, first U.S. alliance concluded in peacetime, provided integrated force for defense of Western Europe and North America.

1950
U.N. General Assembly Uniting for Peace Resolution, presented by the U.S., gave basis for common action against aggressor in Korea.

1963
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, first major-power agreement regulating atomic weapons testing, banned explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

1967
Non-Proliferation Treaty, now signed by 110 governments, banned spread of atomic weapons.

1972
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements with U.S.S.R. prescribed mutual limitations on defensive and offensive weapons and established SALT as a continuing process.

1972
President Nixon's February visit to China followed Secretary Kissinger's earlier negotiations in Peking, marking first important step in process of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China.

1973
Paris agreement provided for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

1974-75
Middle East consultations by Secretary of State Kissinger facilitated military disengagement in Arab-Israeli conflict and prepared ground for peace talks between Israel and Egypt.

1979
U.S. established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China ending 30 years of nonrecognition.

1979
Israel-Egypt peace treaty ended 30 years of conflict between the two countries and provided possible framework for comprehensive peace in Middle East.

1979
Panama Canal Act returned Canal Zone to Panamanian jurisdiction, leaving canal under U.S. operation through 1999.

1980
Consular convention and three economic agreements completed process of normalizing relations with the People's Republic China.

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